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ABSTRACT 
JOHN A. MacDONALD: An Examination of Airline Pricing: Testing the Effects of Mergers and 
Uncertainty on Average Fare and Dispersion 
(Under the direction of John F. Stewart) 
 
This dissertation uses data from the late 1980s to examine pricing, mergers, and market 
concentration in the airline industry.  It is motivated by a current airline pricing theory that 
predicts prices dispersion is increasing with demand uncertainty and costly capacity.  This 
theory directs my analysis towards three concurrent goals.  First, I provide quantifiable 
figures for uncertainty in airline pricing.  Second, I empirically establish the relationships 
between airline price dispersion and uncertainty, competition, and costly capacity.  And third, 
I attempt to evaluate the effects mergers have on average fares and fare dispersion in the 
airline industry.   
Two key results obtained in the analysis contradict the theory: uncertainty is found to 
negatively impact dispersion, and average fares are found to fall with mergers.  The former 
casts doubt on the applicability of the theory, while the latter suggests efficiency gains can be 
expected to outweigh market power abuses following a merger.  While these results cannot 
definitively disprove the going theories, they call into question the true roles demand 
uncertainty and competition play in the specific case of the airline industry.   
The empirical analysis is followed by a detailed discussion of the drawbacks inherent in 
the current theory’s underlying assumptions and key results.  Potential alternate applications 
of demand uncertainty theory are also explored.  Finally, I present the groundwork for a new 
concept of “residual supply” as a determinant of airline pricing.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The historical source of current airline pricing practices can be traced to the deregulation 
of the industry.  In 1978, the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) forced the airline industry onto 
a path from inefficiency to competition.  While the process would surely include mergers, 
bankruptcies, and entry, it has proven to be slow.  Three decades later, we still categorize 
airlines based on their relationship to the regulated era.  Inefficient “legacy carriers” existed 
prior to the ADA, while efficient “startup carriers” emerged afterwards.  Both still exist today 
in a fiercely competitive business environment.  It would appear that legacy carriers are 
reluctant to give up their markets without a fight. 
The primary difference between the old and new carriers is their cost structures: legacy 
carriers are high cost, startups are low cost.  During regulation, airlines faced few 
competitive pressures to obtain or maintain efficient operations.  The Civil Aeronautics 
Board (CAB) chose routes, fares, and competitors for any airlines operating at the time.  
High fares and protected markets led to expensive union concessions, bloated management 
structures, and other inefficient business practices.  The giant airlines that resulted were ill-
equipped to handle deregulation, as startup carriers proved to be very aggressive competitors. 
In situations where protected firms are suddenly exposed to low cost entrants, they face 
three options: compete, retreat, or disappear.  Thus, legacy carriers could match rivals’ costs, 
consolidate into monopolistic hubs, or go bankrupt.  Obviously, bankruptcy is not an 
 2 
attractive option,1 and the adoption of low cost business practices is difficult; otherwise it 
would have happened by now.  This leaves consolidation as the easiest route, even if it is but 
a temporary reprieve from the low cost onslaught.  Regardless of the reasoning, consolidation 
ensued, providing mergers with an integral role in shaping this new environment.   
Since deregulation was achieved under the premise that airline markets were in some way 
highly contestable,2 mergers may have been part of the deregulatory plan from the start.  Free 
market consolidation of airline markets was expected to achieve a more competitively fair 
consumer environment characterized by efficient operations.  With this thinking, virtually 
every airline merger that had been sought in the years following the ADA was approved by 
the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT).   
The 1980s in particular appear to be a lax period of antitrust enforcement in which no 
proposed merger was denied approval (see Kim and Singal 1993, Singal 1996).  Then, in the 
1990s, merger activity dried up as major airlines tended to retreat into monopolistic “fortress 
hub” networks (Zhang, 1996) rather than seek further consolidation.  In more recent years, 
however, the issue of airline mergers and their effects on society has once again aroused 
attention.  Various code-sharing alliances, merger agreements like the 2005 deal linking US 
Airways and America West, and the 2006 proposed merger of US Airways and Delta have 
fueled speculation of another merger wave.  A contraction is perhaps unsurprising given the 
prolonged industry-wide financial crisis highlighted and exacerbated by the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001. 
                                                 
1
 Bankruptcy, in this context, is considered final.  It should not be confused with Chapter 11 bankruptcy, a 
potentially desirable legal protection allowing struggling firms to restructure operations in order to survive. 
2
 See Graham (1983) for early empirical evidence against contestable market theory.  
 
 3 
Thus, in an effort to better understand the implications of the next contraction, this paper 
looks to the late 1980s for evidence of what to expect.  This period was chosen for three 
reasons.  First, since this was a period of heightened, uncontested merger activity, there are 
numerous observations to analyze (see table 1).  Second, rich data from this period are 
available due to DOT data accumulation efforts following deregulation.  And third, since the 
practice of inventory management was well developed by this time, pricing patterns should 
be more consistent and less experimental than they were in the early days of deregulation. 
Table 1: 
Merger Market Information 
 
First Quarter 
after merger 
Affected 
markets 
Percent of 
all markets Acquirer Target 
86q4 1948 8% NWA Inc Republic Airlines 
86q4 757 3% Trans World Airlines Inc Ozark Holding Inc 
87q1 0 0% Texas Air Corp (Continental) Rocky Mountain Aviation 
87q1 1287 5% Texas Air Corp (Continental) Eastern Air Lines Inc 
87q1 403 2% Delta Air Lines Inc Western Airlines Inc 
87q1 5 0% Alaska Air Group Inc Jet America Airlines 
87q1 157 1% Texas Air Corp (Continental) People Express Inc 
87q3 131 1% American Airlines Inc(AMR) ACI Holdings (AIRCAL) 
87q3 24 0% US Air Group Inc Pacific Southwest Airlines 
87q4 19 0% Alaska Air Group Inc Horizon Air Industries Inc 
88q1 2553 11% US Air Group Inc Piedmont Aviation Inc 
88q1 2 0% Braniff Inc(Dalfort/Hyatt Air) Florida Express (IMM Inc) 
88q4 0 0% AMR Corp Wings West Airlines Inc 
88q4 0 0% AMR Eagle-East (AMRCorp) Command Airways Inc 
89q1 1002 4% American Airlines Inc (AMR) Braniff-Leasehold Interests 
 
The empirical approach employed is an examination of relationships between merger 
activity and various relevant economic variables.  It uses data that was accumulated and 
constructed over an extensive set of representative U.S. markets, and is motivated by a 
theoretical pricing model found in the economic literature.  The theory’s main conclusions – 
that price dispersion increases with competition, uncertainty, and capacity costs – serve as 
 4 
the basis for variable definition and coefficient determination in the empirical analyses.  
Consequently, this paper also attempts to test the conclusions predicted by the theory.   
Two models are utilized in the analysis, each with its own benefits and limitations.3  First, 
fixed-effects regressions are performed on panel data to discern the impact of changing each 
variable on price dispersion and average fare.  Second, ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions on cross sections of first-differenced data are performed in an attempt to deal 
with endogeneity problems present in the fixed-effects approach.  Results from each model 
are presented, and comparisons between the two are made. 
Most merger studies of this time period consider a one-time effect a merger might have on 
pricing at, immediately prior to, or immediately following completion of the merger. This 
paper differs in its attempt to track the effects of mergers over time.  It also differs in its 
incorporation of demand uncertainty as an explanatory variable.   
The approach will be useful on four main counts.  First, this empirical analysis offers 
creative ways to quantify demand uncertainty as identified in the theory.  Second, the 
resulting uncertainty figures are used in regressions to determine that the true role of 
uncertainty in price dispersion may be opposite to the theoretical predictions: dispersion 
appears to be falling with uncertainty.  Third, I use my empirical results to test hypotheses 
derived from the theory of pricing under demand uncertainty with costly capacity.  And 
fourth, it is useful to see whether or not airlines exhibit different patterns of price dispersion 
after merging versus before. 
Hence, from an academic standpoint, the results of this study will aid in the evaluation of 
the theory itself.  In the instances where they contradict the theory, as with the effect of 
uncertainty on dispersion, researchers should question the shortcomings of the theory and 
 5 
seek ways to improve them.  Similarly, when mergers cause increases in concentration but 
the airlines involved fail to exercise market power, we should question the underlying 
concerns of antitrust authorities.  Conversely, in the instances where my results support the 
theory, as with demonstrating the role costs play in determining dispersion, we have better 
reason to believe those aspects of the theory are sound.    
From a policy standpoint, any new information we can obtain from analyzing the pricing 
activities of merging firms can be used as a means of evaluating proposed mergers.  
Although any attempts thus far to evaluate the merits of airline mergers ex ante are subject to 
a great deal of debate, the more information available to evaluate mergers, the better.  
Evaluating the merits and drawbacks of changes in price dispersion, for example, will be a 
good way to do this if it seems to be a direct indicator of monopolistic pricing – even though 
the intuition of price discrimination leads us to conclude the opposite whenever dispersion 
falls with mergers. 
Finally, from an industry standpoint, firms can also benefit from understanding the 
implications of historical mergers by modifying their pricing behavior following future 
mergers.  If airlines know that significantly reduced price dispersion, coupled with higher 
average fares, sends strong monopolistic signals to antitrust authorities, they may attempt to 
avoid such scrutiny by stabilizing pricing practices for some time after they merge.  While 
this may complicate the evaluation process, such behavior could lead to net societal welfare 
gains – assuming at least some efficiency gains are obtained – without excessively 
transferring welfare from consumers to airlines.  In the spirit of limit pricing theory, airlines 
with newly obtained monopoly power may, as a result, seek to maintain some threshold level 
of “limit dispersion” indefinitely to avoid triggering DOJ scrutiny. 
                                                                                                                                                       
3
 Benefits and limitations of each setup will be discussed later in the paper. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 provides a review of the 
general airline and price dispersion literature.  Chapter 3 presents a simplified version of the 
theoretical model.  Chapter 4 discusses the basic empirical setup and data, while chapter 5 is 
a detailed data analysis.  Chapter 6 describes the empirical models I employ, and chapters 7 
and 8 discuss and interpret the results.  Finally, chapters 9 and 10 conclude the study. 
 
 
  
 
  
 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
In order to understand the context in which this project is pursued, three brief, topical 
reviews of the empirical airline literature are warranted.  The first is a review of how the 
newly deregulated environment developed.  The second is to see how price dispersion arose 
amidst new and highly sophisticated pricing tactics.  The third is a survey of the mergers 
studies performed to date and how they relate to the present paper.   
 
Airline Deregulation 
Airline deregulation was largely pursued under the promise that contestable markets 
would lead to more competition, increased output, and lower prices.  The idea is an extension 
of limit pricing theory: the mere ability of airlines to freely enter markets without cost would 
act as a deterrent against monopolistic pricing.4  While this deregulation clearly enabled and 
inspired several mergers between various carriers, it also led to significant developments in 
pricing practices and competitive interaction.   
After deregulation, there was an initial movement to determine whether or not airline 
markets are in fact contestable.5  Results suggest they are not.  Peteraf and Reed (1994) assert 
that deregulation has not resulted in the anticipated contestability of markets, although 
                                                 
4
 Limit pricing: where monopolists mark up price as far above marginal cost as possible without provoking 
entry. 
5
 See Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982) for contestable markets theory. 
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potential entry is in some way a disciplinary force against incumbent pricing abuses.6  Yet 
Morrison and Winston (1987) show that the effects of potential competition on limit pricing 
behavior are small, and are much less significant than actual competition.  They find that 
frequent flier programs, attractiveness of branded carriers, and airport dominance increase 
prices but decrease competition.  They also find that the monopolist's national market share 
has a positive effect on fares over and above that of airport share and route share.   
Their most statistically significant result is that distance has the greatest effect on yields: 
for every 10% increase in distance, we can expect average fares per passenger mile to fall 
6.4%.  Interestingly, the lowest cost potential entrant7 that is present on at least one endpoint 
of the monopoly routes is usually a rather high cost major airline like United or Delta.  This 
is the case 94% of the time.  Thus, on the routes where low cost carriers share endpoints, the 
effect of potential competition is much higher.  Abromowitz and Brown (1993) find similar 
results. 
In short, while it is generally believed that contestable markets did not materialize, a wide 
variety of competitive forces has shaped the industry since deregulation.  Pure monopoly, 
fierce competition, and everything in between has occurred, thus presenting researchers with 
plenty of fodder for analysis.   
 
Price Dispersion Papers and Studies 
In order to understand the direction the literature on price dispersion has taken, a 
distinction between the terms price discrimination and price dispersion must be made.  Much 
of the theoretical literature departs from the traditional view of price discrimination that 
                                                 
6
 See Borenstein (1992) for a summary of results.  See Peteraf (1994) for evidence of limit pricing. 
 9 
analysts have long assumed was the source of fare variation.  Price discrimination refers to 
the individual firm’s ability to segment the demand it faces into different populations with 
different price elasticities to which it can charge different prices.  By doing so, the firm with 
monopoly power can extract consumer surplus from the market demand.  Similarly, such 
pricing is believed to increase with concentration.  While some discrimination is good from 
the regulator’s perspective (i.e., if it expands market size to service more customers), they 
generally frown upon abusive price discrimination as it may unfairly strengthen the power of 
the firm at the expense of the consumer. 
Price dispersion, on the other hand, can exist for reasons other than simple price 
discrimination, and is not necessarily increasing with concentration.  Generally defined, price 
dispersion refers to the variation in prices offered by different firms selling essentially the 
same product to the same group of consumers.  The differentiation arises from consumers’ 
real or perceived differences in how they value the products they face.  While traditional 
price discrimination will lead to dispersion, demand uncertainty and costly capacity may 
influence or even be the sole cause of dispersion as well.  Gale and Holmes (1993) provide a 
strong theoretical model explaining this phenomenon.  In addition, it is widely acknowledged 
that peak load pricing tactics will lead to price dispersion no matter what the level of 
competition or demand uncertainty.  Thus, the fact that price dispersion cannot be attributed 
entirely to the implementation of monopoly power must be acknowledged when interpreting 
empirical results based on the analysis of any measurement of dispersion.8 
With this in mind, the first paper to empirically estimate the extent of price dispersion in 
airline markets is Borenstein and Rose (1994).  Their cross sectional analysis of the industry 
                                                                                                                                                       
7
 Defined as the carrier with the lowest cost structure already operating flights at least one of the endpoint 
airports that may enter the market in question relatively easily 
 10 
for the second quarter of 1986 has two main objectives.  First, they aim to quantify the extent 
of fare inequality in the airline industry and describe patterns of price dispersion across 
markets.  Second, they attempt to distinguish price dispersion due to discriminatory pricing 
from the type resulting from differences in cost.  To do so, they use a Gini coefficient to 
measure intra-firm price dispersion in approximately 521 U.S. airline markets served by 11 
major carriers. 
They found considerable price dispersion in the U.S.  In 1986, the average difference in 
prices paid by two random passengers was 36% of the mean ticket price.  They also found 
that more competitive routes seem to have more price dispersion, whereas market power and 
highly homogenous passenger attributes are associated with lower price dispersion.   Further, 
they found that more congestion (in terms of flights per market, signifying highly demanded 
routes) implies more price dispersion, which is consistent with peak load pricing.  
Interestingly, they find that price dispersion is positively correlated with average fare.  While 
this supports the traditional assertion that market power leads to price discrimination along 
with higher average fares, it may be explained by the characteristics of the airlines that 
exhibit market power.  That is, major airlines employing hub-spoke networks may have 
better segmentation techniques than smaller competitors, which lead to more dispersion. 
The next paper to measure price dispersion in the U.S. is by Hayes and Ross (1998), who 
extends the work done by Borenstein and Rose in several ways.  First, the data are more 
recent and comprehensive: the panel data set employed is for several quarters from 1990-
1992.  Second, price dispersion is defined under three different alternatives: the Gini 
coefficient, Atkinson index, and entropy index.  Third, their analysis focuses on separating 
                                                                                                                                                       
8
 Measurements of dispersion include but are not limited to standard deviation and the gini coefficient.  
 11 
the sources of price dispersion based largely on the existence of fare wars.  Finally, the 
sample includes many more airports, and regional differences are accounted for. 
Hayes and Ross find robust results that suggest a disjunction between price dispersion and 
price discrimination.  They find that price dispersion is mainly associated with peak load 
pricing schemes rather than market power.  Planned price dispersion will occur when airlines 
have sufficient information about the demand they face, while continuously updated fares 
contribute to the accuracy of such information.  Unplanned price dispersion allegedly results 
from fare wars.  If an airline tries to keep prices above marginal cost but lacks the market 
power to sustain such markups, it will invoke a price war.  This particular result pertains to 
the present analysis as mergers should reduce the incidence and scope of fare wars. 
Finally, Kim and Singal (1993) used the event study approach to evaluate the mergers of 
the 1980s by distinguishing between market power and efficiency effects that result from 
mergers.  Rather than looking at stock valuations, as event studies typically do, they focused 
on the average fares paid by travelers.  In order to distinguish between the two opposing 
price effects, they formulate a theory about when each effect takes place.  First, the 
announcement of the merger is enough to signal market power that will affect the way the 
merging firm marks price above marginal cost.  Second, once the merger is “complete,” the 
newly merged firm will be able to take advantage of cost synergies and charge lower fares to 
its consumers.  Their model compares the routes that are affected by the merger with 
unaffected routes and concludes that airline mergers do in fact lead to higher average fares on 
affected routes: fares on affected routes increase almost 10% compared with unaffected 
routes.  This results in a wealth transfer from consumers to producers. 
 12 
In sum, while some studies have looked at cross sectional data on the airline industry to 
measure the effect of market power on price dispersion, others have looked at the effects of 
mergers on average fares.  A goal of this paper is to take these two types of empirical 
literature discussed above and bring them together to further evaluate mergers in the airline 
industry.  The main contribution of this paper over previous studies is thus an attempt to 
evaluate mergers over time on the basis of their effects on both price dispersion and average 
fare, while incorporating uncertainty and elapsed time from merger completion as 
explanatory variables.  If observed price dispersion can indicate the extent to which 
monopoly power is being used or abused, we can use the mergers of the 1980s as a basis for 
evaluating merged airline anticompetitive behavior ex post, particularly if average fares rise.  
This has important policy implications because it provides antitrust authorities with a directly 
observable means with which to evaluate historical airline mergers as a premise for 
evaluating future merger proposals ex ante. 
 
Merger Questions 
When evaluating mergers in general, the following three antitrust questions arise, 
assuming that mergers produce increases in market power.  First, are there efficiency gains 
from the merger that will lower production costs?  Second, will those lower costs be passed 
on to the consumer in the form of lower prices?  And third, which effect will have a 
dominant influence on prices: will net prices be lower from efficiency gains or higher from 
market power abuses?   
Answers to these questions in the context of the airline industry have been provided by 
numerous studies with varying conclusions.  While each has benefited from and relied upon 
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the wealth of revenue data provided by the DOT, each has suffered from a general lack of 
accurate carrier and market-specific cost data.  Such data tends to be proprietary.  However, 
industry-wide estimates of fuel and non-fuel costs per seat mile are readily available, as are 
certain market characteristics, like distance and hub congestion, all of which provide decent 
proxies for cost.   
 
Direct Merger Studies 
Most of the studies, including part of the present one, focus on the direct impact mergers 
have on average fares paid by passengers (Kim and Singal, 1993; Singal, 1996; Borenstein, 
1990; Morrison et al, 1990; Beutal and McBride, 1992; Morrison, 1996).  Such studies have 
an intuitive appeal: if, on average, fares tend to be higher after the merger, we can assume 
that market power dominates efficiency gains.  Under such circumstances, we can argue that 
the merger has resulted in a transfer of welfare from consumers to the airlines involved.  If, 
on the other hand, average fares tend to be lower following a merger, we can assume that 
efficiency gains outweigh market power creation, ultimately benefiting consumers and 
producers alike.  The typical results suggest market power is stronger: Borenstein and Rose, 
for example, demonstrated that average fares rose about 10% on routes affected by mergers, 
while Singal found fares to rise as much as 14% due to increased multi-market contact 
resulting from mergers.  Some, like Beutel and McBride’s 1992 study of the Northwest-
Republic merger, show evidence of weakened pricing power following mergers.   
Morrison and Winston (1990) provide strong support for the deregulation that occurred – 
despite the merger waves – in a hypothetical comparison of actual fares to those which would 
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have occurred had regulation endured.9  The goal was to show that market forces, rather than 
deregulation, caused increases in fare levels.10  They conclude that, on average, regulated 
fares would have been 18% higher than the deregulated fares we see, although route distance 
matters: long-haul markets are found to have decreased fares (probably due to increased real 
competition through alternate route permutations resulting from the hub/spoke system), while 
shorter markets have increased fares (due to increased monopoly hub activity to and from 
specific short-haul spokes).  Also, the effective number of competitors at the route level is 
still on average a mere 1.9, further suggesting that the competitive gains from deregulation 
are limited.  Nonetheless, they tend to advocate the deregulated climate over the regulated 
one, despite the implications of any particular merger. 
Regardless of the data or outcome, the method of directly measuring a merger’s impact on 
average fares is not immune from criticism.  For example, it is possible that mergers in the 
1980s dealt with the problem of excess capacity that developed in the deregulated 
environment.  Excess capacity leads to low average prices, possibly below the average cost 
of production, making economic viability difficult.  Through consolidation, merged airlines 
may have provided a healthier, more sustainable environment in which to operate 
profitably.11  Such an environment would lead to higher, more stable prices and thus would 
explain – or perhaps even justify – the higher average fares.  Similarly, it has been argued 
that many failing airlines which charge very low “fire sale” fares on the eve of bankruptcy 
are prime candidates for takeover.12  Once they are acquired, the fire sale markets return to 
                                                 
9
 They used techniques employed by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) for pricing fares prior to the 
deregulation of 1978 to see what CAB pricing might have looked like; this was compared to actual fares. 
10
 “Fare Levels” in Morrison/Winston means average fare levels, which is not to be confused with the 
dispersion figure “Farelevels” in the empirical analysis of this paper. 
11
 Found in either Kim/Singal or Hayes/Ross. 
12
 Also found in Kim/Singal or Hayes/Ross. 
 15 
“normal” pricing schemes and average fares subsequently rise.  In either of these cases, the 
expected result is for average prices to rise – which may not be a bad thing if it stabilizes the 
industry, even though higher average fares might appear to indicate the exercise of excess 
market power. 
The present paper, in fact, finds that merger activity might actually lead to lower average 
prices in each of the four quarters following completion of a merger, which would indicate 
that efficiency gains outweigh any market power creation.  One possible source for the 
discrepancy between studies is the breadth of the data used: for example, while Borenstein 
and Rose tested 1,201 markets from one quarter and Singal tested 11,628 markets over 
sixteen quarters, the present study tests 23,439 routes over twenty quarters.  The present 
study also includes certain key measures, discussed in detail below, that were excluded from 
other studies.   
 
Indirect Merger Studies 
A second approach in evaluating mergers is to focus on indirect methods of evaluation.  
One way is to bypass fares and costs altogether, using event studies to check for abnormal 
stock returns13 of affected firms to discern the effects of the merger on society (Eckbo 1983, 
Knapp 1990).  This theory stipulates that, if a merging airline’s stock value sees abnormally 
high returns but their competitors see negative returns, efficiency gains have been made and 
the stock run-up is attributed to the merged airline’s ability to compete more effectively 
relative to other airlines.  On the other hand, if both the merged airlines and their competitors 
exhibit higher returns, the resulting industry consolidation theoretically makes collusion 
easier; hence, the market power outweighs efficiency gains.   
 16 
This event study method is subject to much criticism as it is, at best, an indirect, 
incomplete, and controversial way of measuring the effects of a merger.  As such, it will not 
be part of the present analysis. 
 
This Paper’s Approach 
A third, subtler method of evaluating mergers is presented in this paper.  I believe the 
behavioral effects and societal impacts of mergers in the airline industry that are attributable 
to market power can be determined by examining both the change in average fares and the 
change in the extent of price dispersion practiced by the newly merged airlines.  This idea is 
motivated by the literature that emphasizes the roles of costly capacity and demand 
uncertainty in determining the amount of price dispersion on a route (Dana, 1999).  The 
theoretical model predicts that dispersion and average fares will rise with uncertainty and 
capacity costs.  Accordingly, measures of both are included in this study of mergers to help 
explain the many ways mergers can affect a market. 
Evidence of a merger’s impact on price dispersion, for example, is obtained through fixed 
effects regressions that include several merger dummy variables.  As such, this analysis is an 
indirect evaluation of mergers through their effects on other key market indices.  It is also a 
dynamic study that departs slightly from the empirical literature in that a merger is 
considered to be time varying in its effect on a market.   
At the same time, the occurrence of a merger in any particular market will, for some time, 
cast an uncertain tone on the competitive environment.  This will have significant 
ramifications on both average fare and dispersion pricing behavior.  It will be argued later in 
the paper that competitive stability goes a long way towards providing demand certainty and 
                                                                                                                                                       
13
 A related study of average fare “returns” is discussed in the literature section. 
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pricing stability, both of which are desirable traits from the standpoint of any market 
participant. 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER III 
DANA’S THEORY OF PRICE DISPERSION 
 
Since the theory upon which this paper is based comes from James Dana (1999), a 
detailed review of his model is warranted.  I have constructed a simplified version of his 
model based on the assumption of linear demand and have verified the theoretical result that 
prices will be most dispersed in the competitive environment, less dispersed in duopoly 
(which can be generalized to any sized oligopoly), and least dispersed in monopoly.14  
Similarly, average fares are theoretically highest in monopoly, lower in duopoly, and lowest 
in perfect competition.  The results are applicable to the firm and, consequently, market 
levels of dispersion and average fare.  The model assumes identical firms and thus provides 
no insights regarding the differences in fares across firms.15  
The basic premise of the theory is that the levels of demand uncertainty and costly 
capacity facing firms will, ceteris paribus, determine the level of equilibrium price 
dispersion.  While Dana’s analysis can be applied to any industry with these characteristics – 
he suggests the hotel, restaurant, and rental car industries, among others – his focus is on the 
airline industry as it seems to fit the spirit of his theoretical results most closely.16  As 
opposed to earlier studies by Prescott (1975) and Eden (1990), Dana’s model predicts inter 
and intra-firm price dispersion in the context of various types of competition, including 
                                                 
14
 Standard Deviation is used as the measurement of dispersion in the simplified theoretical model. 
15
 This is consistent with Dana’s results, which are based on symmetric outcomes for non-monopoly setups. 
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monopolies and monopolistic competition.  The earlier models consider intra-firm price 
dispersion in perfect competition only. 
The theory is not without flaws, however, as it relies on several crucial assumptions and 
outcomes that seem unrealistically rigid when applied to real-world situations.  The 
assumptions and outcomes that require critical attention are as follows: 1) dispersion is 
increasing with uncertainty, 2) uncertainty and prices are “rigid,” 3) demand shows up in 
random order, and 4) residual demand is the primary mechanism through which the 
aforementioned results are obtained.  Each will be addressed in the discussion section 
following the empirical results of this paper.  In the meantime, the model is presented as 
justification for the empirical specifications.  
The simplest way to look at the problem is to consider two demand types: a high demand 
type with low price elasticity and a low demand type with high price elasticity.  The high 
demand type is typically thought to be the time-sensitive business traveler, while the low 
demand type is typically thought to be the price-sensitive leisure traveler.  When two firms 
compete in a market containing such distinct demand types, they tend to aggressively bid for 
the low demand types.  This competition brings down the prices offered to these highly 
elastic consumers.  The firms do not, however, compete away their profit margins on the high 
demand consumers as much as in the low demand case.  To some extent this is due to the fact 
that high demand consumers choose their flights based on very inflexible criteria, such as 
specific flight times, comfort, reliability, and, of course, brand loyalty.17  Hence, high 
demand consumers are not very responsive to increased competition.  Accordingly, the fares 
                                                                                                                                                       
16
 The restrictions, on the other hand, are imperfect when applied to any industry, but are reasonable for 
advancement of the theory. 
17
 Frequent flyer programs provide strong sentiments of brand loyalty. 
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they pay do not change much as a result of increased competition.  Borenstein (1989) and 
Bilotkach (2005) found evidence of this fact. 
A related explanation concerns the nature of a market’s competition.  Often the 
“competition” on a given route will occur between a major carrier and a regional one.  
Regional airlines typically do not compete for high-paying business travelers, whereas they 
compete aggressively for the bargain traffic.18  In this case, the interfirm spread, or 
“dispersion,” between fares is fairly high.  Yet if the two firms merge, they will not have to 
compete anymore for the price sensitive leisure travelers.  Thus, the new firm will charge 
higher prices to the low demand consumers without increasing the prices they charge to the 
high demand consumers.  Accordingly, the spread or “dispersion” between fares narrows 
with mergers as intense competition for elastic consumers is reduced. 
Further, dispersion arises from the type of price discrimination practiced in the airline 
industry.  As mentioned earlier, consumers of airline products have fairly distinct tastes and 
preferences.  While airlines have a good idea about the general aggregate distribution of 
these preferences, they have difficulty identifying them when making sales.  As such, they 
conduct second degree price discrimination by offering packages of price/quality 
combinations.  The “quality” component is reflected in such ticket restrictions as Saturday 
night stayovers, non-refundability of tickets, and advance ticket purchase requirements.  
These restrictions enable ticket sales to distinguish the time sensitive business travelers who 
are willing to pay a premium for last minute, fully refundable tickets.  It is an imperfect 
distinction, however, because business travelers have much less predictable flight schedules 
than leisure travelers.  This unpredictability adds to the uncertainty that their demand will 
                                                 
18
 Probably do to less desirable slots, fewer flight options, lack of frequent flier programs, etc. that tend to 
drastically reduce the demand for regional flights by inflexible business travelers. 
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materialize close to flight time.  Holding perishable seats open for last minute potential walk-
up sales to such consumers is expensive if the seats have a high probability of going unsold.  
Hence, the firm facing this demand uncertainty requires higher marginal revenue for those 
seats if they wish to keep expected revenues on par with “cheap seats” sold ahead of time 
with much more certainty.19   
Finally, although specific airline cost figures are generally unavailable, purchasing 
airplanes and running airlines is known to be an expensive endeavor.  Capacity is constrained 
in the short run, making availability of walk-up seats more expensive to the airlines from an 
opportunity cost standpoint.  Hence, the more expensive this shadow cost of capacity, the 
more an airline is going to charge to provide it.  It must cover the expected loss in case that 
walk-up demand fails to materialize. 
Thus, the basic model derived from Dana’s theory considers a two demand state situation 
that compares the equilibrium outcomes of perfectly competitive, oligopolistic, and 
monopolistic firms that operate amongst characteristics mirroring those that are laid out 
above.  The problem facing these firms is one of expected profit maximization in a market 
characterized by demand uncertainty and costly capacity.  Development of the model relies 
on the concept of residual demand.   
 
The Theoretical Model 
Linear demand is assumed for three reasons.  First, as this paper provides a simplification 
of Dana’s model, linear demand enables a more intuitive understanding of the points found 
therein.  Second, extending the basic two-state approach to include oligopolies is more 
                                                 
19
 A seat sold in advance for $100 with 100% certainty must sell for $200 at the last minute if there is a 50% 
certainty of sale at that time in order to justify holding the seat.  As the probability of sale falls, this price rises. 
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tractable with linear demand.20  And third, from a graphical standpoint, many of the demand 
curves in the airline markets analyzed in this paper are fairly linear.  
The intuition behind the model is that there are two possible demand states facing firms 
for any day’s sales: low and high demand that each occur with known probabilities.  In the 
context of the model, low demand means a small number of travelers show up to buy tickets, 
while high demand means a large number do.  Demand uncertainty is represented by the 
probability of each demand state occurring: high demand occurs with probability λ, and low 
demand occurs with probability (1-λ).  Costly capacity is represented by the marginal cost, c.  
Firms must make their daily output and pricing decisions before it is clear which demand 
state will materialize on any given day, reflecting the real-world practice of airlines setting 
aside expensive seats far in advance of those seats being sold.  They set their high and low 
outputs and prices based on probabilities of sale.  One restriction is that these prices and 
quantities are rigid and cannot be changed once they are set.  Another restriction is that all 
consumers arrive in random order and purchase tickets on a first come/first serve basis, 
choosing the cheaper seats first – regardless of their reservation prices.   
Given the two demand states, the model assumes that all consumers’ reservation prices are 
distributed uniformly on the interval [0,N].  The reservation price is defined as each 
individual consumer’s maximum price he or she would be willing to pay to purchase a seat.  
In the low demand state, N consumers show up to buy tickets.  Thus, at price P < N, (N – P) 
low demand consumers are willing to purchase tickets.  In the high demand state, αN 
consumers show up to buy tickets, where α > 1 is some positive constant that effectively 
increases the number of consumers willing to purchase tickets at any given price.    Hence, at 
                                                 
20
 Cournot duopoly models presented in textbooks use linear demand; such is the case when presented here. 
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that same price P < N, α(N – P) consumers are willing to purchase tickets in the high demand 
state.  In effect, given the same distribution of reservation prices, the high demand state 
simply increases the number of potential consumers willing to pay any given price by a 
factor of α.  Thus, the demand in either state can be summarized by the following functions: 
 
(3.1)  QL(P) = N – P   or P(QL) = N – QL    
(3.2)  QH(P) = αN –αP or P(QH) = N – QH/α     
 
Perfect Competition 
The perfectly competitive firm must choose its profit maximizing price/output 
combinations taking the aggregate distribution of prices and quantities in the market as given.  
This follows from the necessary condition that perfectly competitive firms are price-takers.    
As a result, each price-taking firm offers some small amounts of the overall market’s seats at 
the price(s) determined by the market.  The competitive market will determine the 
equilibrium output at the point where expected revenue equals the marginal cost of offering a 
seat for sale.   
Given the demand uncertainty facing them, firms will offer two prices: a low price in the 
event that demand turns out to be low and a high price in the event that demand turns out to 
be high.  The necessary conditions for competitive market equilibria require that the 
competitive firms will set the quantity of tickets produced and priced for sale at the point 
where expected price equals the marginal cost of production.  All of the low-priced seats will 
sell regardless of the demand state because demand will be at least as high as in the low 
demand state.  Therefore, since there is a 100% chance of selling any cheap seats, the 
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expected revenue per cheap seat equals PL and the cost per cheap seat equals c.  Hence, 
competitive firms will offer their cheap seats at price PL = c. 
The high-price seats are not as sure to sell.  Since high demand may not materialize, there 
is a non-zero probability that the seats offered for sale at the high price will remain unsold at 
the end of the day.  This uncertainty drives down the expected revenue of high priced seats at 
any price.  Given the probability λ that the high demand state materializes, the expected 
revenue per seat is thus λPH.  Therefore, the only way to justify offering additional seats for 
sale is to set a second price high enough to cover expected marginal cost.  Price competition 
will force the high price to an equilibrium at which expected revenue equals marginal cost, or 
PH = c/λ.   
Notice that dPH/dλ <0.  This implies that, as the probability of the high demand 
materializing falls, the high demand equilibrium price in competitive markets must rise to 
compensate for lower expected marginal revenue.21  To sum, the competitive equilibrium 
market prices are as follows: 
   
(3.3)  
λ
cPH =
*
         
(3.4)  cPL =*           
 
Market quantities are determined according to the following demand curves:  
 
(3.5)  LLL PNPfq −== )(  
                                                 
21
 Average fares are thus increasing in uncertainty.  It can also be shown that average fares increase with costs. 
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Notice that the quantity of high priced seats is determined by the residual demand 
function, qRD.  This residual demand is derived from the high demand state: since prices are 
set ahead of demand revelation, some seats are priced and offered at low prices in the event 
of low demand – even though high demand may actually materialize.  Therefore, if the high 
demand state does occur, the low priced tickets will be purchased by those who show up first, 
leaving a smaller pool of eligible purchasers for the high priced tickets.  Since they show up 
in random order, some of the high demand consumers who are willing to pay more for their 
seats only have to pay the low price in the event that they show up first, leaving behind some 
proportion of the high demand to purchase tickets at the high demand price.  Hence, the 
residual demand curve is a proportionally diminished function of the “high demand state” 
demand curve.22   
In terms of the model’s notation, if high demand materializes, qH(PL) is the number of 
consumers with a reservation price > PL willing to buy the qL available tickets, but only 
qL/qH(PL) can be served.  The residual demand is the proportion [1 - qL/qH(PL)]* qH(PH) of 
the high demand that remains after the low priced seats are sold.  Hence, given equilibrium 
prices and the demand functions laid out above, equilibrium quantities are as follows: 
 
                                                 
22
 Note that there is no residual demand in the event that the low-demand state materializes. 
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For expositional purposes, let (α – 1) = γ > 0.  From these equilibrium quantities and 
prices we may compute the following average price and standard deviation for the 
competitive market: 
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Monopoly 
In the case that this market is served by a monopoly, the monopolist chooses quantities 
and prices to maximize its expected profit.  Again, like the competitive firm, the monopolist 
does not know which demand state will materialize when it makes its fixed pricing and 
output decisions.  Hence, the monopolist’s expected profit maximization problem is as 
follows: 
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As with the competitive firm, notice that the monopolist chooses the high demand 
quantity and price based on a residual demand function, qRD, since it has to offer some 
“cheap seats” given the probability of only the low demand state occurring.  The demand 
function in the event that high demand materializes would be qH = g(P) = αN – αP.  
However, this is not the actual demand that is present in the event that high demand 
materializes, since some proportion of these high demand consumers will be able to purchase 
tickets that have been offered at lower prices to satisfy the ex ante possibility of low demand.  
Therefore, if the high demand state occurs, the low priced tickets will be purchased by those 
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who show up first, leaving a smaller pool of eligible purchasers for the high priced tickets.  
Hence the residual demand curve is a diminished function of the “high demand state” 
demand curve. 
Substituting the constraints into the maximization problem, we get the following 
monopolist expected profit maximization problem: 
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The first order conditions for maximization imply the following: 
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From these equilibrium quantities and prices we may compute the following average price 
and standard deviation for the monopoly firm: 
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Oligopoly 
Since markets in the airline industry are more accurately described as oligopilies than 
monopolies or perfect competition, the model should be solved as such.  I employ a standard 
Cornout duopoly model using residual market demand in the high demand state.  The 
representative duopolists allocate their seats for high and low demand taking each other’s 
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output decisions as given in order to maximize their expected profits.  As is the case in any 
Cornout model, their aggregate output decisions affect market prices. 
Letting qLi and qHi be firm i’s low and high outputs, respectively, market and inverse 
demand and residual demands are as follows: 
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Given these inverse market demand curves, firm i‘s profit maximization problem follows: 
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Substituting the constraints into the maximization problem, firm i faces the following: 
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The first order conditions for maximization imply the following: 
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This leads to the following results: 
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From these equilibrium quantities and prices we may compute the following average price 
and standard deviation for the oligopoly firms: 
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Comparing the outcomes of the three models results in the following propositions:  
Proposition 1:  PCAVG
O
AVG
MO
AVG PPP ≥≥  
Proof:   see appendix B. 
Proposition 2:  PCOMO SDSDSD ≤≤  
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Proof:   see appendix C. 
 
Hence, it can be shown that increasing the concentration in a market characterized by 
demand uncertainty (λ) and costly capacity (c) will lead to higher average prices and lower 
dispersion.  Dana’s analysis extends these results to more general cases and includes varying 
levels of oligopoly. 
  
 
CHAPTER IV 
DATA and EMPIRICAL INTRODUCTION 
 
The conclusions of the theory provide direction for estimating the impacts of 
concentration, costs, uncertainty, and mergers on average fare and fare dispersion in the 
airline industry.  Given the nature, depth, and breadth of airline markets, as well as the data 
available to study them, a rich set of panel data has been accumulated.  Aggregate market 
sales are presented as a cross section (by market) over time (by quarter).  Two empirical 
approaches are taken: a fixed effects approach incorporating as much of the panel data as 
possible and a first-differencing approach incorporating observed variations amongst relevant 
two-period subsets of the data.     
 
General Fixed Effects Estimation 
The fixed effects model assumes the presence of time-invarying, unobserved market 
heterogeneity, which is possibly correlated with the regressors.  Since markets are defined 
here as one-way flights between origin and destination cities, certain aspects of a particular 
market do not change with time.  Among them are seasonal desirability for, family 
obligations to, and general tourist curiosity about a city.  Since these relevant variables are 
unobserved, cross sectional analyses suffer from omitted variable bias.  The fixed effects 
model removes this bias by focusing on variations of each observation from the mean of that 
observation within a single market over time rather than variation between markets.  Doing 
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so removes unobserved variables such as those mentioned above, as well as observable ones 
like distance, from the analysis. 
In specifying the nature of the model, average fare and fare dispersion were shown in the 
theory to be functions of essentially the same groups of exogenous regressors: cost variables, 
concentration variables, demand variables, and uncertainty variables.  Thus, a reduced form 
equation for average fare is  
(4.1) itiUitDitMCitCitit XXXXP 14321 '''' εµββββα ++++++=   
where Pit is the average fare in market i at time t, XCit represents cost regressors, XMCit 
represents market characteristic regressors, XUit represents uncertainty variables, and XDit 
represent exogenous factors affecting demand for the good.  The variable µi represents 
unobserved heterogeneity, and β1-4 are coefficient vectors.  The error term, ε1it, is a random 
variable error term unique to each market and time period with an assumed mean of zero and 
variance σ2.  It captures the effects of all other factors that influence fares but are not 
observed.  It is assumed to be uncorrelated with the dependent variable, and the subscript one 
is used to distinguish this random error term from the dispersion equation’s error term. 
Similarly, a reduced form equation for fare dispersion is 
(4.2) itiUitDitMCitCitit XXXXD 24321 '''' εηδδδδγ ++++++=   
where Dit is the calculated level of fare dispersion in market i at time t.  The regressors are 
the same as in the average fare equation, δ1-4 are coefficient vectors, and ηi represents the 
unchanging, unobserved market heterogeneity for each market i.  The error term, ε2it, is 
defined in the same manner as ε1it is defined above, except that it pertains to dispersion.  The 
subscript 2 is used to distinguish this random error term from the average fare’s error term. 
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First Difference Estimations 
Two additional sets of regressions are run using first-differencing.  The main reason for 
employing this second approach is to reduce endogeneity problems inherent in the fixed 
effects estimation.  While the variable-specific endogeneity issues are discussed in detail 
later in this section, the reduced-form empirical models follow. 
For the straight first differencing regressions, the average fare and fare dispersion 
equations above are lagged by n time periods and subtracted from the current time period’s 
average fare and fare dispersion equations.  This will remove any bias that comes from 
unobserved heterogeneity.  The resulting first-differences equations follow. 
(4.3) 
itntMCiMCi
ntUiUintMiMintDiDitntCiCitntiit
xx
xxxxxxxxPP
35,
4,3,2,1,,
)'(
)'()'()'()'()(
εφ
φφφφ
+−+
−+−+−+−=−
−
−−−−−
 
and 
(4.4) 
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The changes in average fare and fare dispersion are regressed on changes in exogenous 
variables related to costs (xCit) and demand characteristics (xDit), the number of changes in 
concentration (xMi) and competitive uncertainty (xUit), and potentially endogenous variables 
affecting market structure (xMCit).  Such first-differencing will not remove the endogeneity 
issues present with certain concentration and cost variables.  Hence, a second set of first-
differecing regressions is run where changes in endogenous concentration and cost variables 
are replaced by changes the values they held in time period t-4.  This produces the following 
first-differences equations. 
(4.5) itntMCiUiMintDiDitntCiCitntiit xxxxxxxPP 55,432,1,, ''')'()'()( ερρρρρ ++++−+−=− −−−−  
and 
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(4.6) itntMCiUiMintDiDitntCiCitntiit xxxxxxxDD 65,432,1,, ''')'()'()( εηηηηη ++++−+−=− −−−−  
In this setup, the changes in average fare and fare dispersion are regressed on changes in 
exogenous variables related to costs (xCit) and demand characteristics (xDit), the number of 
changes in concentration (xMi) and competitive uncertainty (xUit), and the “starting points” of 
potentially endogenous variables affecting market structure (xMCit).  Time-unvarying, 
unobserved heterogeneity is removed through the first-differencing process.  While this setup 
has the appeal of being less prone to endogeneity and possibly more flexible in its analysis, it 
is more limited than the fixed effects model in the variety of regressors employed.23  
Elaboration on this point follows the variable next section. 
 
Variable Definitions 
Given the average fare and fare dispersion equations, the variables used in the fixed 
effects and first differences analyses are grouped in Tables 2 and 3 below.  All observations 
for variables beginning with “REAL” are adjusted for inflation with a base year of 2005.  
Average fare observations are similarly adjusted. 
 
Source Data 
While various data sources are used, the primary data for this paper come from the 
Department of Transportation’s “Ticket Dollar Value Origin and Destination Survey 
(TDVOD survey).”24  Since deregulation, the Department of Transportation (DOT) has kept 
                                                 
23
 The first-difference regressions are run on a set of independent variables that differ slightly from the fixed-
effects regressions.  For a more direct comparison, the same set of independent variables was used for both 
regressions but not formally reported in the results section.  The magnitudes and p-values remained essentially 
unchanged with each specification; see the alternative results in appendix A. 
24
 Data obtained through Severin Borenstein at Cal-Berkeley, who compiles and cleans the DOT data for 
distribution to academics for research purposes 
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extensive records to closely follow the developments of airlines in this new competitive 
environment.  As a result, large, detailed data sets of the industry are available for analysis.   
The TDVOD survey is a random, ten percent sample of airline tickets sold in the U.S.  
This sample is compiled quarterly, and is drawn from all domestic flights, where a “domestic 
flight” is defined as any flight for which the origin and destination airports are both within 
the United States.  Each record in the survey includes the origin and destination, airline, 
mileage, price paid, passengers per sale, and any stopovers used on the route for change-of-
plane service.  The basic observational units in the data are sales records for individual flights 
on American air carriers.  Relevant limitations on the data include the following: there is no 
information on time of flight, number of flights per market, capacity or load per flight (and, 
therefore, load factors), dates of flights, indications of number of stops, or use of hubs (unless 
there is a change of plane).   
Table 2: 
Variable Definitions: First-Difference Regressions 
 
First-Difference regressors Category Interpretation 
gini4yrCHG 
dependent 
variable four year change: fare dispersion; quarterly gini 
Avgfpm4yrCHG 
dependent 
variable four year change: average fare/mile (cents, quarterly) 
herf4yrchg concentration four year change: HHI 
startingHERF concentration the value of the HHI at time period t-n 
changesincomp(100s) concentration frequency of competitive basket changes over 4 years 
percdir4yrCHG market attribute four year change: percent of travelers flying direct 
REALfuelcost4yrCHG cost four year change: estimated fuel costs 
REALnonfuelcost4yrCHG cost four year change: estimated non-fuel costs 
lowcostshare4yrCHG cost four year change: share of passengers on lowcost carriers 
startingLOWCOSTshare cost share of passengers flying on lowcost airlines, period t-n 
regshare4yrchg market attribute four year change: percent of passengers on regionals 
startingREGIONALshare market attribute share of passengers flying on regional airlines, period t-n 
mergers4yrTOTAL(10s) concentration total number of mergers over 4 years (by period) 
metropop4yrchg1000000sO exogenous change in metro population over four years (100,000s) 
REALpcinc4yrchg10000sO exogenous the change in pc income over four years ($1000s) 
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Table 3: 
Variable Definitions: Fixed Effects Regressions 
Fixed Effects 
regressors Category Interpretation 
gini Dependent variable fare dispersion measured by the gini coefficient per quarter 
avgfpm Dependent variable average fare per mile (cents) 
herf concentration Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (sum of squared market shares) 
monopoly concentration indicator variable = 1 if market is served by a sole carrier 
knownqtq uncertainty indicates if competition was the same in quarters t and t-1 
knownyoy uncertainty indicates if competition was the same in years t and t-1 
regional market attribute indicates the presence of a regional carrier in the market 
alaska exogenous/demand indicates if market contains an Alaskan origin/destination 
premium exogenous/demand indicates if the market is serviced by a premium carrier 
percdir market attribute percent of travelers in a market flying direct 
REALfuelcosts cost average quarterly price of jet fuel (cents per seat mile) 
REALnonfuelcosts cost average non-fuel quarterly costs/flight (cents per seat mile) 
lowcost cost indicates if the market is serviced by a low cost carrier 
lowcostshare cost indicates percent of travelers serviced by low cost carriers 
regionalshare market attribute indicates percent of travelers serviced by regional carriers 
md1 concentration indicates if a merger was completed in quarter t-1 
md2 concentration indicates if a merger was completed in quarter t-2 
md3 concentration indicates if a merger was completed in quarter t-3 
md4 concentration indicates if a merger was completed in quarter t-4 
REALmetropop Exogenous/demand origin population measured in $1,000,000 increments 
REALpcinc Exogenous/demand origin per capita income measured in $1,000 increments  
 
 
Variable Cleansing 
For the purposes of this study, the observations found in the TDVOD survey are 
aggregated to the market level.  This is a slight departure from the relevant price dispersion 
theories, which predict intra-firm dispersion (and, by extension, intra-firm average fares).  In 
using market figures, it is assumed that intra-firm pricing will correspond, in aggregate, to 
market-wide pricing.  As such, there are currently no tests of average fare or dispersion at the 
firm level in this project.   
A market is defined as a directionally unique combination of cities serviced by distinct 
airports.  For example, LGA-PIT is different from PIT-LGA, as well as from JFK-PIT.  The 
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decision to aggregate data in this manner reduces the complexity of the analysis by focusing 
on inter-market, rather than inter-firm, dispersion.   
In contrast with the standards set by Borenstein and Rose and employed subsequently by 
Hayes and Ross, I have included all markets in which a change of airplane occurs mid-route.  
From the standpoint of the consumer, change of plane service is significantly less desirable 
than nonstop service or same-plane one-stop service, as well as artificially more expensive 
when interline travel occurs.25  Accordingly, I have decided to include these observations, 
accounting for their presence with an independent variable representing the extent to which a 
market is served by such flights.  Interestingly, this variable turns out to be among the most 
important determinants of dispersion and average fare. 
In accordance with prior studies, I have dropped all markets for which there are zero 
observations in any quarters.  Within markets, I have also dropped all observations where 
distance equals zero, passenger equals zero, or fare equals zero.  Such observations distort 
the analysis because they are assumed to be key stroke errors, restricted frequent flier seats, 
or some other human input error.  Fares equal to zero make Gini calculations meaningless, 
further biasing any analysis based on that statistic.  While distances equal to zero might be 
plausible, they suggest that a passenger’s origin and destination airports are the same.  Even 
if they are not key stroke errors, such observations represent extreme, extenuating 
circumstances that do not fit the spirit of the analysis.  Hence, they are dropped. 
I have also dropped all observations where fares appear to be excessively large.  
Following the standard employed by Borenstein and Rose (1994), all fares greater than four 
times the imputed Standard Industry Fare Level (SIFL) were dropped.  In approaching this 
                                                 
25
 One might also argue that direct service on, say, older DC-9’s is significantly less desirable than direct (or 
even one-stop) service on Boeing 777s, although we certainly wouldn’t drop either group of observations. 
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issue, other studies chose to drop all coach seats greater than $1500 under the assumption 
that they are to be data entry errors (see Hayes and Ross, 1998; Morrison, 1996).26  I prefer 
the Borenstein method because the $1500 rule seems too arbitrary.  Plus, such a method 
seems to favor unconditional exclusion of all large fares despite the possibility that some 
routes might warrant them.27 
Most of the studies referenced here also drop observations of first class tickets, since such 
records allegedly distort price dispersion.  Yet, although first class comprises at most 3% of 
all fares in any quarter, dropping these records may remove an important source of price 
discrimination employed strategically by many airlines that may have significant impacts on 
observed dispersion.  As such, I have chosen to include first class fares in the analysis.28  
Finally, in accordance with Morrison (1996), observations identified as open jaw tickets are 
dropped.  These include ground transportation as part of the travel itinerary, which makes 
direct comparisons with other service much less exact.29  See table 4 for a summary. 
The resulting data sets each contain 23,081 unique markets of summary data for the 
twenty quarters from quarter 1, 1986 through quarter 4, 1990.  This time period provides pre 
and post-merger comparison data for the following sixteen mergers: Air Wisconsin-Aspen, 
American Airlines-Braniff, American Airlines-AirCal, AMR-Wings West, AMR-Command, 
Alaska-Horizon, Alaska-Jet America, Braniff-Florida Express, Texas Air Corp (Continental)-
Rocky Mountain Air, Texas Air Corp (Continental)-Eastern, Texas Air Corp (Continental)-
People Express, Delta-Western, Northwest-Republic, TWA-Ozark, USAir-Piedmont, and 
                                                 
26
 Morrison used the “U.S. General Accounting Office’s Fare Screen 1990” in order to account for carrier 
misinformation.  
27
 See Appendix R for a table showing the number of observations dropped as a percentage of all observations. 
28
 Again, the ultimate product here is transportation from one point to another.  Expensive first class seats 
represent the most price inelastic, high demand consumer, and I believe they should not be dropped. 
29
 See Morrison p 241 for a discussion of slot controls, tourist markets and their potential effects on fares. 
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USAir-Pacific Southwest (PSA).30  There are also several partial mergers in this timeframe, 
which typically constitute the acquisition of routes from an existing airline.  As such, they 
will not be explicitly included in the merger analysis.31   
Table 4: 
Dropped, Change-of-Plane, First Class Observations as Percentages of All Obs 
Quarter Fare = 0 
Change of 
plane 
Open 
Jaw Passgrs = 0 Orig = Dest 
Fare 
>$1500 1st Class 
86q1 1% 30% 2% 0% 0% 1% 3% 
86q2 1% 30% 2% 0% 0% 1% 3% 
86q3 1% 28% 2% 0% 0% 2% 3% 
86q4 1% 29% 2% 0% 0% 2% 3% 
87q1 2% 31% 2% 0% 0% 0% 3% 
87q2 3% 32% 2% 0% 0% 0% 3% 
87q3 4% 32% 2% 0% 0% 0% 3% 
87q4 4% 33% 2% 0% 0% 0% 3% 
88q1 5% 32% 2% 0% 0% 0% 3% 
88q2 5% 32% 2% 0% 0% 0% 3% 
88q3 5% 32% 2% 0% 0% 0% 3% 
88q4 5% 32% 2% 0% 0% 0% 3% 
89q1 4% 31% 2% 0% 0% 0% 3% 
89q2 4% 32% 2% 0% 0% 0% 3% 
89q3 5% 32% 2% 0% 0% 0% 3% 
89q4 4% 32% 2% 0% 0% 0% 3% 
90q1 4% 32% 2% 0% 0% 0% 3% 
90q2 5% 33% 2% 0% 0% 0% 3% 
90q3 5% 33% 2% 0% 0% 0% 3% 
90q4 7% 33% 2% 0% 0% 0% 3% 
 
 
Variable Construction: Dependent Variables 
Recall that a market is defined as a one-way, airline-only trip from an origin city to a 
destination city.  The TDVOD airline information proves useful as it identifies the number of 
carriers, enables calculations of passenger concentration, and enables identification of both 
                                                 
30
 There are 21 full mergers identified in this period.  Some were not included because all affected markets were 
dropped in data cleansing, and some purely horizontal mergers, which are defined as two or more airlines 
operating in markets that do not overlap at all, are not observed in the data.  See table 7 for a summary of 
mergers. 
31
 The effect of partial mergers will be seen in carrier composition, total carrier, and herfindahl changes for 
affected markets.  There is no indicator of the event that caused these, as they are market acquisitions, as 
opposed to “true” mergers 
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competitive baskets and merger activity for each route.  With this in mind, I produce two 
dependent variables: average fare (per mile) per market and fare dispersion per market.   
Average fare per mile is calculated for each market.  Measured in cents, this figure is 
simply the sum of all fares paid by all passengers in a market divided by the passenger totals 
and distance traveled.  Calculating average fare per mile allows for meaningful comparisons 
of fare information between any two markets, regardless of distance.   
The other dependent variable is price dispersion, which can be measured in several ways.  
These include simple standard deviation or the coefficient of variation,32 the Gini coefficient, 
the Entropy Index, and the Atkinson Index.33  I have chosen to construct a Gini coefficient 
from the TDVOD survey data.34  While certain limitations of the Gini coefficient are 
discussed below, this statistic provides a direct calculation of the percentage difference 
between any two randomly drawn tickets regardless of relative market characteristics. 
 
Notes About the Gini Coefficient 
While the Gini coefficient is typically associated with income distribution within a 
nation’s population, it is often used to represent fare distribution in the airline industry.  As 
such, a Gini coefficient has been constructed for this paper in the usual manner as a 
proportion of the graphical areas generated by the Lorenz curve.  Graphs are constructed for 
each market with the “percent of demand” on the horizontal axis and the “percent of revenue 
generated” on the vertical axis.  “Percent of demand” is interpreted as the population of 
passengers flying on a given route, regardless of airline, distributed along the horizontal axis 
in fare order.  This is analogous to the percent of a nation’s population that earn a certain 
                                                 
32
 Cook (2000) is a recent example that uses the coefficient of variation. 
33
 There are other ways of calculating dispersion; these are the methods common to the airline literature. 
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level of income.  “Percent of revenue generated” is interpreted as the percent of total revenue 
generated in a market that is attributed to each grouping of fares.  This, too, is analogous to 
the usual employment of the Gini coefficient: overall revenue generated by a market is akin 
to GDP generated by an economy.   
The Lorenz curve shows the actual fare distribution for a unique market while a 45-degree 
line shows “perfect” fare distribution.  The area generated between the Lorenz curve and the 
45 degree line is divided by the area below the 45 degree line and above the horizontal axis, 
bounded by 0 and 1.  The resulting figure is the Gini coefficient for each market, which also 
ranges from a value of 0 to 1.   
Gini coefficients close to 0 imply very little difference between the fares that are paid by 
all passengers.  One might imagine a market with eleven different fares ranging from $95 to 
$105 dollars, each incrementally greater than the previous by $1: the average is $100, but no 
single fare represents much more than nine percent of total revenue.  The top 18% of buyers 
(the two highest-paying travelers) represent 19% of market revenue.  Hence, the cumulative 
distribution of the fares paid by passengers as a percentage of total market revenue does not 
deviate much from a 45 degree line.   
Compare that with a situation where the first nine passengers paid $40-$48 each while the 
last two passengers paid $352 and $354.  The average is still $100, but the top 18% is 
responsible for 64% of market revenue.  This dispersion creates a wider deviation from the 
45 degree line, resulting in a bigger calculation of the Gini coefficient.  Higher coefficients 
imply higher levels of dispersion, and the Gini essentially measures the extent to which mean 
and median fares diverge.   
                                                                                                                                                       
34
 Using the Gini appears to be standard practice, and is part of all empirical analyses mentioned in this paper. 
 45 
Since the number of passengers, number of fare levels, and actual fares vary by market, 
each Gini coefficient is a discreetly calculated figure based on unique information.  In table 
5, I have provided sample data and Gini calculations for four representative markets: 
Allentown-Albequerque (ABE-ABQ), Allentown-Albany (ABE-ALB), Allentown-Atlanta 
(ABE-ATL), and Atlanta-Chicago (ATL-ORD).35 
Table 5: 
Sample Source Data for Various Gini Constructs 
 
Market Passengers Fares Distance Points on Lorenz Curve Gini 
ABE-ABQ 4 3 1737 2 0.299525 
ABE-ALB 9 6 167 5 0.074897 
ABE-ATL 124 42 693 41 0.167758 
ATL-ORD 5237 248 607 247 0.241658 
 
The corresponding Lorenz Curve graphs are as follows in Figures 1-4, which show the Lorenz 
curves from which the Gini coefficients are calculated.  Some markets, such as ABE-ABQ 
ABE-ALB have very little traffic.  This produces few reference points, and, subsequently, 
very discreet, linear Lorenz curves.   
 
 
Figure 1: ABE-ABQ Lorenz Curve                             Figure 2: ABE-ALB Lorenz Curve 
                                                 
35
 ABE-ABQ, ABE-ALB, and ABE-ATL are the first three markets in the data.  ATL-ORD is a large market 
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Figure 3: ABE-ATL Lorenz Curve         Figure 4: ATL-ORD Lorenz Curve 
As market traffic increases, the number of fares offered tends to increase as well, 
providing more points of reference for the Lorenz curve.  ABE-ATL has 124 passengers 
traveling on 42 different fares, while ATL-ORD has 5,237 passengers traveling on 248 
different fares.   Both of these markets have very smooth Lorenz curves, in effect enabling 
the discreet calculations to approximate continuous ones.   
The fact that some Gini calculations are more discrete than others, however, does not 
necessarily affect the ability to compare Gini’s across markets.  Note that the Gini’s can still 
vary widely within groups of small markets and that any potential downward bias in the Gini 
that may result from fewer observations should be accounted for in the regressions with the 
market population independent variable.36  ABE-ABQ and ATL-ORD, for example, have 
remarkably similar Gini coefficients, despite ABE-ABQ’s vastly smaller sample size.  The 
number of passengers in a market is but one of many variables explaining the Gini 
coefficient, and as such a proxy for it is included in the regressions.  
 
                                                 
36
 Regressions will help determine if the number of reference points affects the value of the Gini, ceteris paribus 
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Variable Construction: Independent Variables 
The independent variables are drawn from the theory and can be grouped into one of four 
categories, each of which is predicted to impact price dispersion: market size, market 
structure, costs, and certainty.37  As proxies for market size, I use metropolitan population 
and market income data,38 the percent of direct flights on a route, and indicator variables for 
atypical markets such as those with Alaskan, premium, and/or regional service.  The percent 
of direct flights variable, percdir, is the percent of travelers who are on a direct flight 
between the origin and destination cities.  This is a relevant explanatory variable because 
there is a big difference between consumers’ desirability of and thus willingness to pay for a 
direct flight versus one with change-of-plane service.  As such, a high percentage of direct 
flights should imply that the market size is large enough to sustain enough travelers to 
warrant the use of direct flights.  The expected effect of this variable is a positive relationship 
to dispersion and average fare because a high percentage of direct flights might imply larger 
markets, greater competition, and increased dispersion.39  Interestingly, while the 
observations used to construct this variable were excluded from most previous empirical 
studies,40 the percdir variable is found to be among the most important determinants of 
dispersion and average fare in the present analysis. 
The market structure variables used include concentration, merger dummies representing 
market-level merger activity, and a dummy variable for pure monopolies.  Concentration is 
measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is constructed by taking the sum 
                                                 
37
 Several variables included in other studies are not included here.  Brueckner et al (1992)  used temperature 
differentials and per capita income, for example.  This data is available for the present study but has not yielded 
meaningful results. 
38
 obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
39
 It is assumed that larger markets will provide more opportunities for entry as it will be easier for potential 
competitors to meet minimum efficient scale in such markets than it would be in smaller markets. 
40
 Cook (2000) uses a similar figure of “nonstop travel” in his cross sectional study. 
 48 
of the squared market shares of paying passengers on a route by each airline operating on the 
route.41  The HHI directly indicates the amount of competition present on a route.  Although 
there are various endogeneity issues that need to be addressed concerning the HHI, it is an 
essential variable for use in any analysis of market power.42  
The number of mergers affecting a route indicates a specific change in concentration, 
while the number of carriers on a route gives a basic indication of the level of competition.  
Population and total income levels, on the other hand, while not providing a direct sense of 
the amount of competition on a route, indicate whether or not demand in a local market is 
large enough to sustain multiple carriers.  Bigger markets have more passenger traffic, which 
allows additional carriers to satisfy any minimum efficient scale (MES) requirements.  Thus, 
population as a proxy for passenger traffic levels should be a strong indication of the extent 
of competition and the level of demand on a route.43   
Previous studies have found distance to be an important determinant of both average fare 
and fare dispersion.44  Since it does not vary with time, distance will not be used as an 
explanatory variable in the fixed effects or first differencing analyses. 
Given the difficulty of obtaining accurate cost data for any airline, costs are represented 
by the average quarterly price of jet fuel and the Department of Transportation’s quarterly 
estimate of non-fuel costs per available seat mile.45  Daily information for jet fuel prices was 
obtained through the Energy Information Administration at the Department of Energy and 
aggregated to average quarterly figures,46 while the non-fuel costs per available seat mile 
                                                 
41
 Singal (1996) used the same method for constructing concentration from the data. 
42
 See appendix for a discussion of endogeneity issues concerning the Herfindahl Hirschman Index. 
43
 Population information was used as a proxy for market passenger data due to endogenous nature of actual 
market passenger data. 
44
 See Borenstein (1989), Kim and Singal (1993), Singal (1996), Hurdle et al (1989).. 
45
 See http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/X-50%20Role_files/standindustfarelevel.htm for non-fuel cost data. 
46
 See http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/steo_query/appparesult.asp 
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were obtained from the Department of Transportation’s Office of Aviation Analysis.  The 
price of jet fuel, which is a crucial component in the marginal cost of operating an airline, 
fluctuates significantly from quarter to quarter.  The amount of dispersion in a particular 
market can, ceteris paribus, be expected to fluctuate as well.  Since the theory predicts 
increasing dispersion with increasing cost, there should be a positive coefficient on the price 
of jet fuel when regressed on dispersion.   For similar reasons, the average quarterly non-fuel 
costs per available seat mile should have a similar effect on pricing. 
 
Variable Construction: Independent Variables: Certainty 
The final category, certainty, is the most difficult to quantify.  The theory expressly 
predicts that dispersion increases with uncertainty.  Conversely, dispersion should decrease 
with certainty.  The type of uncertainty described by the theory concerns the total demand 
that will have materialized by the day of the flight.  Since the true state of demand, large or 
small, is not revealed until the day of the flight, there is a substantial element of uncertainty 
involved with planning sales in advance of departure.  The further a sale is from departure,47 
the more uncertainty there is. 
One way to approach the question of quantifying uncertainty is to look at the process of 
planning for advance ticket sales.  Airlines typically employ inventory managers to 
determine seat allocations for sale some 320 days before the departure date for all flights.  
Managers can base reasonable predictions of the airline’s demand on historical demand and 
familiarity with the markets in which the airline operates.  The more historical data available, 
the easier it is to gauge future demand.  Further, this familiarity-based forecasting is more 
                                                 
47
 For example, a ticket sold 300 days ahead of departure versus one sold three days ahead of departure. 
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“certain” when the market basket of competitors remains stable.48  For example, three 
straight data sets in period t-3 through period t-1, in which the competition remained 
unchanged, leads to a fairly clear expectation of the demand an airline will face in period t.  
In contrast, a lack of data, a changing competitive environment, or both, will cast 
considerable doubt on the accuracy of the forecast.  In essence, the general rule is that a less 
“changing” competitive environment is a more “certain” competitive environment.   
With this in mind, I have constructed five fairly simple “certainty” variables.  For the 
fixed effects analysis, the first certainty measure is a quarter-to-quarter certainty variable 
equal to 1 if the same competitors were present in the quarter immediately prior to the current 
quarter, and is equal to 0 otherwise.  The second is a year-over-year certainty variable equal 
to 1 if the same competitors were present in the quarter one year prior to the current quarter, 
and is equal to 0 otherwise.   
For the first-differences analysis, “changes in competition” statistics are generated to 
capture the extent to which the market basket of competitors had changed on a year-over-
year basis.  This statistic counts the number of times quarterly competition changed during 
the overall time period in question.   
Since none of these figures pay attention to the relative importance of each competitor, all 
that matters is that the same few airlines find themselves competing with one another in 
subsequent time periods.  As for the periods of comparison, the use of both quarter-to-quarter 
and year-over-year as separate certainty figures is warranted because of the cyclical nature of 
airline demand.  Some markets may experience high amounts of carrier competition in, for 
example, the summer, but not the winter.  Each market also has its own local idiosyncrasies 
                                                 
48
 From 1995-1997, the author was responsible for setting seat allocations for sale on USAirways flights 
between several major northeastern cities and several major Florida cities. 
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which may adhere to a cyclical schedule.  In fact, it is instructive to view each grouping of 
quarters as a quasi-separate data set of continuous observations.   
At the same time, in the spirit of the learning-by-doing models, each subsequent quarter of 
consistent competition should yield meaningful information irrespective of cyclical 
consistency.   Providing a running count of the competition would indicate a very high 
degree of “certainty.”  In fact, this is the exact kind of analysis inventory managers undertake 
on a daily basis in order to best discern the demand they face.  Any deviation from the 
expected basket of competitors hinders predictive power, especially if the deviation includes 
a low-cost carrier like Southwest Airlines. 
Table 6: 
Summary Table of Means: Fixed Effects Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gini 466180 0.258 0.090 0 0.89 
Avgfpm 466180 20.201 9.519 0.01 82.90 
Herf 466180 0.660 0.259 0.003 1 
Monopoly 466180 0.249 0.432 0 1 
Knownqtq 443099 0.562 0.496 0 1 
Knownyoy 396937 0.380 0.485 0 1 
Regional 466180 0.029 0.167 0 1 
Alaska 466180 0.003 0.057 0 1 
Premium 466180 0.000 0.019 0 1 
Percdir 466180 0.147 0.282 0 1 
REALfuelcost 466180 1.976 0.300 1.64 2.64 
REALnonfuelcost 466180 10.769 0.615 9.98 12.01 
Lowcost 466180 0.140 0.347 0 1 
lowcostshare 466180 0.043 0.161 0 1 
regionalshare 466180 0.007 0.062 0 1 
md1 443099 0.021 0.144 0 1 
md2 420018 0.022 0.148 0 1 
md3 396937 0.024 0.152 0 1 
md4 373856 0.025 0.157 0 1 
metropop (millions) 466180 1.700 2.707 0.01 19.80 
REALpcinc (1000s) 466180 28.946 5.102 9.79 53.56 
lnGINI 459196 -1.425 0.485048 -7.7 -0.12 
lnAVGFPM 466180 2.8936 0.483429 -4.34 4.418 
lnHERF 466180 -0.504 0.44028 -5.96 0 
lnmetpopO 466180 -0.261 1.292444 -4.47 2.99 
lnREALpcincO 466180 3.3502 0.174272 2.28 3.98 
  
 
CHAPTER V 
DETAILED DATA TREND ANALYSIS 
 
Tables 7 and 8 contain the pairwise correlation matrices for most of the variables included 
in the regressions.  The merger dummy variables, cost variables, and squared population 
variables were excluded from the fixed effects table because they were not significantly 
correlated with any of the other independent variables. Most of the population and all of the 
income variables were excluded from the first difference table for similar reasons.  The 
remaining correlations follow expectations. 
Figures 5 and 6 show the quarterly trends of the weighted Gini coefficient and HHI, 
respectively.49  Figure 7 shows the quarterly trend of weighted Average Fares, figure 8 shows 
the average number of carriers per quarter, and figure 9 shows the quarterly price of jet fuel.  
Over the time period studied, there is a slight increase in concentration that corresponds to a 
more pronounced increase in dispersion, as well as an increase in the average fare per mile.  
The average number of carriers operating in a market trended upwards over this time period 
as well, which is interesting considering the slight upward trend in concentration.  The 
quarterly fuel trends found in figure 9, appear to be relatively stable. 
Regardless of the reasons for these upward trends, the theory predicts a different 
relationship between dispersion and concentration: dispersion should be falling with 
concentration, not rising with it.  Further, the increase in the number of carriers in the 
                                                 
49
 The Gini coefficient and HHI are weighted by passenger volume and sales. 
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markets does not necessarily imply increased levels of competition.  Evidence of this fact is 
the concurrent increase in concentration.  The increasing HHI figures suggest that any gains 
from competition-enhancing entry were more than offset by losses from incumbent 
expansion. 
Table 7: 
Pairwise Correlation Matrix for First Difference Regressions 
Variable 
gini 4yr 
CHG 
avgfp
m 4yr 
CHG 
starting 
HERF 
herf 
4yrchg 
changes 
in comp 
percdir 
4yr 
CHG 
REAL 
fuelcost 
4yr 
CHG 
gini4yrCHG 1.00       
avgfpm4yrCHG -.01 1.00      
startingHERF .05 -.04 1.00     
herf4yrchg -.15 .09 -.46 1.00    
changesincomp -.01 .04 -.34 -.04 1.00   
percdir4yrCHG .03 .11 -.06 .11 .01 1.00  
REALfuelcost4yrCHG .12 -.05 -.03 .01 -.04 -.02 1.00 
REALnonfuelcost4yrCHG -.11 .05 .04 -.01 .04 .02 -.98 
lowcost4yrCHG .01 -.07 .03 -.18 .03 .00 .03 
startingLOWCOSTshare .09 .04 -.04 .03 .09 -.02 -.04 
lowcostshare4yrCHG -.03 -.07 .01 -.08 .00 .05 .05 
startingREGIONALshare .00 .00 -.03 .02 .07 -.07 .00 
regshare4yrchg -.01 .02 .02 -.04 -.04 .08 .00 
mergers4yrTOTAL .00 .06 -.41 .18 .29 .02 .00 
metropop4yrchgOxD .04 .02 -.19 .02 .21 .01 .00 
        
 
REAL 
nonfuel 
cost 4yr 
CHG 
Low 
cost 
4yr 
CHG 
starting 
LOW 
COST 
share 
lowcost 
share 
4yrCHG 
starting 
REGION 
share 
regshare 
4yrchg 
mergers 
4yr 
TOTAL 
REALfuelcost4yrCHG        
REALnonfuelcost4yrCHG 1.00       
lowcost4yrCHG -.04 1.00      
startingLOWCOSTshare .05 -.31 1.00     
lowcostshare4yrCHG -.06 .61 -.56 1.00    
startingREGIONALshare .00 -.10 .12 -.13 1.00   
regshare4yrchg .00 .14 -.11 .19 -.75 1.00  
mergers4yrTOTAL .00 .03 .02 .01 .03 -.03 1.00 
metropop4yrchgOxD .00 .08 .05 .02 .03 -.03 .34 
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Table 8: 
Pairwise Correlation Matrix for Fixed Effects Regressions 
Variable gini avgfpm herf monopoly knownqtq knownyoy percdir 
gini 1.00       
avgfpm -.29 1.00      
herf -.36 .23 1.00     
monopoly -.34 .12 .74 1.00    
knownqtq -.09 .04 .18 .26 1.00   
knownyoy -.11 .06 .24 .30 .39 1.00  
percdir .03 .16 -.06 -.18 -.15 -.14 1.00 
lowcost .06 -.07 -.26 -.20 -.11 -.12 .29 
lowcostshare -.07 -.02 -.05 -.08 -.04 -.04 .20 
regionalshare -.05 .07 -.03 -.05 -.04 -.04 .12 
metropop1000000sO .13 -.06 -.09 -.09 -.08 -.08 .18 
metropop1000000sD .13 -.06 -.09 -.10 -.08 -.08 .18 
metropopOxD1000000s .14 -.06 -.14 -.13 -.13 -.12 .31 
REALpcinc1000sO .14 -.12 -.14 -.14 -.11 -.10 .17 
REALpcinc1000sD .13 -.12 -.15 -.14 -.11 -.10 .17 
REALpcincOsquared .13 -.12 -.13 -.13 -.10 -.09 .16 
REALpcincDsquared .13 -.13 -.13 -.13 -.10 -.09 .16 
REALpcinc1000sOxD .20 -.17 -.23 -.21 -.18 -.16 .27 
        
Variable lowcost 
lowcost 
share 
regional 
share 
metropop 
1000000sO 
metropop 
1000000sD 
metropop 
OxD 
1000000s 
REAL 
pcinc 
1000sO 
lowcost 1.00     
  
lowcostshare .66 1.00    
  
regionalshare .08 .09 1.00   
  
metropop1000000sO .08 .02 .01 1.00  
  
metropop1000000sD .07 .02 .01 -.10 1.00   
metropopOxD1000000s .14 .05 .01 .43 .43 1.00  
REALpcinc1000sO .09 .00 .03 .50 -.12 .22 1.00 
REALpcinc1000sD .09 .00 .03 -.13 .51 .22 -.13 
REALpcincOsquared .08 .00 .03 .50 -.11 .22 .99 
REALpcincDsquared .08 .00 .03 -.12 .50 .22 -.12 
REALpcinc1000sOxD .14 .00 .04 .28 .28 .35 .65 
        
Variable 
REAL 
pcinc 
1000sD 
REAL 
pcinc 
OxO 
REAL 
pcinc 
DxD 
REAL 
pcinc 
1000sOxD    
REALpcinc1000sD 1.00    
   
REALpcincOsquared -.12 1.00   
   
REALpcincDsquared .99 -.11 1.00  
   
REALpcinc1000sOxD .65 .65 .65 1.00 
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Figure 5: 
Quarterly Weighted Gini Coefficients 
  
 
Figure 6: 
Quarterly Weighted Concentration 
Quarterly Trend: Weighted Herfindahl
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Figure 7: 
Quarterly Weighted Average Fares 
Quarterly Trend: Weighted Average Fare per Mile
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Quarterly Trend: Weighted Gini
0.000 
0.020 
0.040 
0.060 
0.080 
0.100 
0.120 
0.140 
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 
Quarter 
Average Gini 
Sales Weighted Gini 
Passenger Weighted 
Gini 
 56 
Figure 8: 
Quarterly Average Number of Carriers 
Quarterly Trend: Average Number of Carriers per 
Market
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Figure 9: 
Quarterly Average Oil and Jet Fuel Prices 
Quarterly Trend Analysis: Average Oil and Jet 
Fuel Prices
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Figures 10-13 show the same data broken into four separate trend lines by quarter.  
Grouping the data in this manner assumes that cyclical idiosyncrasies have a stronger 
influence on some of the variables than simple quarter-to-quarter data suggest.  The upward 
trend in carrier presence, for example, is much more clear and discernable.  
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The data trends for average overall concentration are more easily observed at the quarterly 
level of observation as well.  There appears to be a slight rise in concentration in each 
quarterly grouping over the first four years followed by a noticeable drop in concentration 
during the fifth year.  This happens regardless of the quarter observed, and it occurs in both 
the sales and passenger weighted observations (see figure 11). 
At the same time, there is a clear indication that average fares are increasing year over 
year when observing the data in similar quarters.  Figure 12 shows a steady increase in 
average fares that can be partially explained through the simultaneous observation of 
increasing concentration.  While the fifth year of data fails to show as pronounced a drop in 
average fares as the fifth year of concentration showed for that statistic, there is definitely a 
consistent trend that affects both statistics in predictably aligned ways.  
Finally, there appears to be an upward trend in Gini price dispersion over the same time 
periods in which concentration, average fares, and the number of carriers are rising.  This is 
still a bit of a discrepancy in that the predicted effect of increased concentration is decreased 
dispersion.  Whereas the continuous change in concentration from one quarter to the next 
failed to show any obvious rise, the year-over-year comparisons of similar quarters reveal 
that concentration is definitely rising.  As discussed with the quarterly data, dispersion should 
be falling over this period.  In any event, it is clear from the charts that year-over-year 
upward trends occur in every quarter for every statistic measured here: carriers, 
concentration, average fares, and dispersion all show very noticeable upward trends when 
isolating yearly data points by quarter.   
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Figure 10: 
Overall Average Carriers per Market Broken Down by Quarter 
 
Figure 11: 
Year-Over-Year Concentration Trends Broken Down by Quarter 
 
Year-Over-Year Trend:
Average Carriers All Markets
Quarter 1 1986-1990
2.40
2.60
2.80
3.00
3.20
3.40
1 2 3 4 5
Year
Av
er
ag
e 
Ca
rr
ie
rs
Average Carriers
Year-Over-Year Trend:
Average Carriers All Markets
Quarter 2 1986-1990
2.40
2.60
2.80
3.00
3.20
3.40
1 2 3 4 5
YEar
Av
er
ag
e 
Ca
rr
ie
rs
Average Carriers
Year-Over-Year Trend:
Average Carriers All Markets
Quarter 3 1986-1990
2.40
2.60
2.80
3.00
3.20
3.40
1 2 3 4 5
Year
Av
er
ag
e 
Ca
rr
ie
rs
Average Carriers
Year-Over-Year Trend:
Average Carriers All Markets
Quarter 4 1986-1990
2.40
2.60
2.80
3.00
3.20
3.40
1 2 3 4 5
Year
Av
er
ag
e 
Ca
rr
ie
rs
Average Carriers
Year-Over-Year Trend:
Weighted Herfindahl
Quarter 1 1986-1990
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
1 2 3 4 5
Year
A
v
e
ra
ge
 
H
e
rf
in
da
hl
Sales Weighted
Herf
Passenger
Weighted Herf
Year-Over-Tear Trend:
Weigthed Herfindahl
Quarter 2 1986-1990
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
1 2 3 4 5
Year
A
v
e
ra
ge
 
H
e
rf
in
da
hl
Sales Weighted
Herf
Passenger
Weighted Herf
Year-Over-Year Trend:
Weighted Herfindahl
Quarter 3 1986-1990
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
1 2 3 4 5
Year
A
v
e
ra
ge
 
H
e
rf
in
da
hl
Sales Weighted
Herf
Passenger
Weighted Herf
Year-Over-Year Trend:
Weighted Herfindahl
Quarter 4 1986-1990
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
1 2 3 4 5
Year
A
v
e
ra
ge
 
H
e
rf
in
da
hl
Sales Weighted
Herf
Passenger
Weighted Herf
 59 
Figure 12: 
Year-Over-Year Average Fare Per Mile Trends Broken Down by Quarter 
 
Figure 13: 
Year-Over-Year Dispersion Broken Down by Quarter 
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CHAPTER VI 
EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
Fixed effects and first difference regressions of the Gini coefficient and average fare are 
run on regressors drawn from the theory.  The main benefit of the fixed effects regressions is 
that the results are descriptive of the relationships amongst the variables in question: they 
incorporate a wide breadth of regressors, providing more thorough direction in subsequent 
analysis of the theory than previous studies.  The main cost is endogeneity: there are 
insurmountable endogeneity issues arising from the inability to identify proper instruments.  
The structurally more robust first difference regressions reduce these issues of endogeneity, 
but at a cost.  The tradeoff is that fewer regressors are included, limiting this model’s ability 
to test the effects of certain key theoretical predictions.  Hence, both approaches are useful in 
their respective ways, and are separately pursued, presented, and interpreted in this analysis. 
Since the theory assumes linear demand, the independent variables in the regressions that 
follow take linear and linear-in-the-logs form.  Separate regression results including time-
varying dummies and quadratic market proxies are included in Appendix A. 
 
Fixed Effects Regressions 
The independent variables for the fixed effects regressions were selected to meet the 
theoretical criteria of the model.  Separate models of the Gini Coefficient as a measure of 
dispersion and average fare per mile are estimated in both linear and linear in the logs fashion 
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using the same set of independent variables.50  The linear model is a straight panel data 
regression of the market values of each dependent variable on the market values of the 
independent variables.  The linear in the logs model is specified in one of two ways: a model 
where the independent variables are converted to natural logarithmic form and a model 
where both the independent and dependent variables are converted to natural logarithmic 
form.  Since the theory does not provide any guidance as to the exact structural nature of the 
relationships investigated in this paper, all regressions were run on each variable, and a 
goodness of fit test is run on each to determine the most appropriate form. 
The Gini coefficient is regressed on cost proxies, uncertainty proxies, market structure 
variables, and merger dummy variables that are determined by the theory.  The independent 
variables include the HHI Index, merger dummies, proxies for cost, potential demand 
indicators of population and metropolitan income for the origin and destination cities, low 
cost carrier information, indicator variables for special circumstances like Alaska routes and 
premium service, and a trio of certainty variables.   
Many of the regressors have been used in prior studies of price dispersion in the literature, 
and all conform to the theory laid out by Dana.  New to this study is an attempt to quantify 
and estimate the effects of certainty on dispersion and average fare.  Certainty in a market is 
defined in any period as the observation of the same bundle of competing airlines that 
occurred in the previous quarter.  Of interest are the quarters immediately prior to and one 
year prior to the current quarter.  For example, if the current airline mix is United, Delta, and 
American Airlines, the year-over-year certainty variable (knownyoy) equal 1 if that exact 
same basket of competitors existed one year prior and 0 otherwise.  Similarly, if that exact 
same combination occurred in the quarter immediately prior, the quarter-to-quarter certainty 
                                                 
50
 Both will be calculated at the market level, as opposed to the firm level. 
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variable (knownqtq) will equal 1.  Finally, in the first-differences regressions discussed later, 
the number of times a market basket of competitors changes (changesincompetiton) is used 
as an indication of uncertainty.  Demand certainty is decreasing with the frequency of 
changes to the competitive mix. 
All of the certainty variables are based on the logical assumption that, for airlines 
operating in a market, prior experience with a specific set of competitors is more “certain,” 
ceteris paribus, than an entirely new, previously unknown basket of competitors.  However, 
it is important to note that the exact kind of “uncertainty” being tested for here is slightly 
different from the type described by the Dana model.  Nonetheless, the inclusion of these 
proxies provides a starting point for explaining the true role uncertainty plays in the pricing 
decisions of firms. 
In order to determine the most appropriate empirical fit, a Hausman specification test was 
performed after the regressions were run under both fixed and random effects specifications.  
The results indicate that a fixed-effects model is the appropriate specification, which is 
warranted as many of the cross sectional differences between airlines and markets generally 
do not change from quarter to quarter.   
Using various merger indicator variables, the regressions should effectively isolate the 
impact of mergers on various price indices.  Sixteen full and ten partial mergers have been 
identified in this time frame, although data cleansing has reduced the number of full mergers 
observed in the dataset to twelve.  The ten partial mergers are not explicitly identified as they 
tend to be picked up in isolated market transfers.  The four full mergers not observed were 
purely horizontal in nature and, accordingly, fail to appear in the data due to lack of market 
overlap.   
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The first regression estimated on the 20 quarters of panel data is as follows: 
(6.1) 
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The dependent variable, Gini, is the quarterly level of market price dispersion as measured 
by the Gini coefficient.  This is regressed on the Herfindahl index/HHI (Ηerfit), the 
percentage of direct passengers flying in each market (PercDirit),51 quarterly jet fuel prices 
and DOT non-fuel cost estimates as proxies for cost (jetfuelpriceit), two measures of demand 
uncertainty (knownyoyit, knownqtqit), metropolitan population and income figures as proxies 
for market size (metropop1000000sit and (REALpcinc1000sit), and various dummy variables 
for merger activity (MD1-MD4it), the presence of low cost carriers, regional carriers, 
premium service, and Alaska routes.  The variable ω1i represents unobserved market 
heterogeneity, and the error term ε1it is a random variable disturbance term unique to each 
market and time period assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of σ2.  
As per Dana’s theory, I expect positive changes in the HHI to be negatively associated 
with price dispersion: the more concentrated the market, the lower the dispersion we should 
expect.  Since I expect increases in the market size to indicate peak load pricing, larger 
markets, and, more potential for competition, I expect positive population and total income 
effects.  Since the theory suggests that dispersion increases as costs rise, I expect the cost 
variables to have a positive effect on dispersion.   
                                                 
51
 The data distinguishes between direct and change-of-plane service.  Prior studies dropped all observations 
with change-of-plane service.  I choose to include these observations but account for their presence. 
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The percentage of passengers flying direct in a market should have a negative effect on 
price dispersion.  This should be the case since changing planes reduces the efficiency and 
attractiveness of the product.  In order to entice passengers to buy tickets with change-of-
plane requirements, one should expect the airlines to offer reduced fares on such tickets.  
Thus, when the percentage of passengers changing planes is higher, the observed price 
dispersion should be too.52  This result would counter the intuition suggested by prior 
research that change-of-plane service should raise the cost of travel.  
One of the key points to the Dana theory is that increased uncertainty leads to more 
dispersion.  As such, I would expect a negative effect on dispersion with each of the three 
certainty variables: more certainty should equal less dispersion. 
The time varying merger dummy variables indicate when, if, and how mergers affect a 
market.  I define a “market affected by a merger” as one in which two newly merged firms 
both operated prior to their merger.  After a merger occurs, a dummy variable will indicate 
the event for each of four quarters following completion of the merger in order to track the 
effects of the merger over time.  Each dummy will take the value MD = 1 in the event that 
the merger criteria are met that quarter, and MD = 0 otherwise.  Each merger dummy variable 
is indicated by MDit, where i = the market in which the merger occurs, and t = the quarter in 
question.  Since mergers results in greater concentration, I expect them to have negative 
impacts on dispersion. 
For the panel data regressions of average fare, most of the independent variables will be 
the same as mentioned above.  The unobserved market heterogeneity is represented by 
                                                 
52
 This may not hold at the extremes: if, for example, all passengers on a route experience change-of-plane 
service, then all fares and revenues are reduced in tandem, which may actually lead to less price dispersion. 
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variable ω2i, and the error term ε1it is a random variable assumed to be normally distributed 
with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of σ2. The average fare regression is  
(6.2) 
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Average fare should be increasing with the HHI, the percentage of passengers flying 
direct, mergers, and certainty, and decreasing with market potential.  It should also be 
decreasing with the presence of low cost carriers, especially if low cost carriers comprise a 
large percentage of the traffic in a market.  
 
First-Differences Regressions 
The second set of regressions attempts to deal with the endogeneity issues raised with the 
fixed effects regressions.  Two versions of this regression are run: a straight first difference 
regression and a modified first difference regression.  The dependent variables in the straight 
first difference model are defined as changes from one period to the next rather than static 
values obtained in a given quarter.  The independent variables are chosen to coordinate with 
the fixed effects regressions as closely as possible in order to maintain logically consistent 
results comparisons.  In some cases, however, the same independent variables do not carry 
over from the fixed effects regressions.  An example is the certainty variables.  Recall that 
the year-over-year certainty variable equals one if the same basket of competitors is 
operating in the market one year to the next, and equals zero otherwise.  Since the first 
difference regressions take a much broader, four-year look at the changes in dispersion and 
average fares, this variable is no longer a strong indicator of certainty.  The same goes for the 
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quarter-to-quarter certainty variable, which is essentially meaningless over the four year 
period.  The number of changes to competition, however, is included because it is a better 
indicator of certainty.  It is constructed for each time period to assess the number of times 
competition changed on the route.   
For the modified first difference regression, changes in the Gini coefficient and average 
fare per mile are regressed in OLS cross sections on various exogenous changes, various 
endogenous starting points, and changes to market structure.  The change variables are the 
same as in the straight first difference regressions.  Included among them are pc income and 
population information.  The number of mergers that were completed during each time 
period in each market is also included in both types of regressions.  Finally, the endogenous 
starting points include initial concentration (HHI), initial share of low cost carriers, and 
initial share of regional carriers.   
These regressions are done by quarter over the entire time period.  I looked at the changes 
in dispersion and average fare over the following four-year periods: quarter 1 1986 through 
quarter 1 1990; quarter 2 1986 through quarter 2 1990; quarter 3 1986 through quarter 3 
1990; and quarter 4 1986 through quarter 4 1990.  I performed each of these regressions 
separately, running each regression as both a straight first-difference regression and as a 
modified first-difference regression using the endogenous starting points described above.  I 
also ran a pooled first difference regression with dummy variables for each season to account 
for the possibility of seasonal demand variation.  Although the interpretations are less direct, 
I expect the results of these regressions to correspond with the theory in the much the same 
way as the fixed effects regressions described above.  In each equation, the error terms and 
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unobserved market heterogeneity follow the same structure and assumptions as the fixed 
effects regressions.  The cross section regressions are  
(6.3) 
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CHAPTER VII 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS: FIXED EFFECTS MODEL 
 
Regression results are based on all twenty time periods, which include 466,180 
observations on 23,309 one-way markets.  The estimations were corrected for 
heteroskedasticity using robust errors.  Due to correlation concerns between two sets of 
independent variables (monopoly/herfindahl and knownqtq/knownyoy), six formulations of 
the models were run for each dependent variable.  All of these results are reported in the 
corresponding tables.  Additional results that consider quadratic income data, quadratic 
population data, and quarter specific dummy variables are found in Appendix A.  They are 
not separately reported here because the results are essentially the same across specifications.  
Table 17-A in Appendix A provides a summary comparison of the different results. 
 
Gini as Price Dispersion 
The results are essentially in line with expectations for both the linear and linear in the 
logs regressions of the Gini coefficient as price dispersion, and it should be noted that 
virtually all of the coefficients are of the same sign for both regressions.  The only sign 
change is for the market population, while four of the sixteen independent variables obtained 
coefficients opposite to expectations.   
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Table 9: 
Regression Output: Linear Gini Dispersion 
 
  Gini Regressions With Herfindahl Gini Regressions With Monopoly 
 and the Following Certainty Variables: and the Following Certainty Variables: 
  qtq and yoy qtq only yoy only qtq and yoy qtq only yoy only 
herf -.056** -.056** -.056** - - - 
 (.001) (.001) (.001)    
monopoly - - - -.031** -.031** -.031** 
    (.001) (.001) (.001) 
knownqtq(100s) .075* .069* - .181** .190** - 
 (.024) (.024)  (.024) (.024)  
knownyoy(1000s) -.312 - -.145 .464 - .859** 
 (.272)  (.268) (.272)  (.268) 
regional(100s) .558** .561** .549** .665** .660** .644** 
 (.077) (.077) (.077) (.077) (.077) (.077) 
alaska(100s) .076 .070 .087 -.025 -.016 .005 
 (.589) (.589) (.589) (.583) (.583) (.583) 
premium(100s) -.589 -.588 -.594 -.809 -.811 -.824* 
 (.363) (.363) (.363) (.355) (.355) (.355) 
percdir .028** .028** .028** .019** .019** .019** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
REALfuelcost .021** .021** .021** .021** .021** .021** 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
REALnonfuelcost(100s) .743** .741** .744** .726** .730** .728** 
 (.023) (.022) (.023) (.023) (.022) (.023) 
lowcost(100s) .462** .465** .459** .707** .703** .701** 
 (.056) (.056) (.056) (.055) (.055) (.055) 
lowcostshare -.013** -.013** -.013** -.014** -.014** -.013** 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
regionalshare -.014** -.014** -.014** -.012** -.012** -.011** 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
md1 -.004** -.004** -.004** -.004** -.004** -.004** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
md2 .003** .004** .004** .003** .003** .003** 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
md3 .003** .003** .003** .003** .003** .004** 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
md4 -.006** -.006** -.006** -.006** -.006** -.006** 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
metropop(1,000,000s) .017** .017** .017** .016** .016** .016** 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
REALpcinc($100,000s) -.220** -.220** -.221** -.217** -.217** -.218** 
 (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) 
       
F-Stat 560.19 593.15 591.44 568.65 601.97 599.04 
R-Squared .519 .519 .519 .521 .521 .521 
Number of Units 373856 383856 373856 373856 373856 373856 
Standard errors in parentheses; * Significant to the .05 level; ** Significant to the .01 level. 
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Table 10: 
Regression Output: Linear in the Logs Gini Dispersion 
 
  lnGINI Regressions With lnHERF lnGINI Regressions With Monopoly 
 and the Following Certainty Variables: and the Following Certainty Variables: 
  qtq and yoy qtq only yoy only qtq and yoy qtq only yoy only 
lnHERF -.136** -.137** -.136** - - - 
 (.003) (.003) (.003)    
monopoly - - - -.144** -.143** -.143** 
    (.003) (.003) (.003) 
knownqtq .001 .001 - .007** .007** - 
 (.001) (.001)  (.001) (.001)  
knownyoy -.003 - -.002 .002 - .004* 
 (.002)  (.001) (.002)  (.001) 
regional .033** .033** .033** .037** .036** .036** 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
alaska .018 .018 .019 .005 .005 .006 
 (.041) (.041) (.041) (.041) (.041) (.041) 
premium -.043 -.043 -.043 -.050* -.050* -.051* 
 (.023) (.023) (.023) (.022) (.022) (.022) 
percdir .136** .137** .136** .092** .092** .092** 
 (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
lnFUELCOST .191** .190** .191** .194** .195** .195** 
 (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
lnNONFUELCOST .381** .379** .381** .369** .371** .369** 
 (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) 
lowcost .029** .029** .029** .041** .041** .041** 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
lowcostshare -.045** -.045** -.045** -.049** -.049** -.048** 
 (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) 
regionalshare -.088** -.088** -.087** -.076** -.075** -.075** 
 (.022) (.022) (.022) (.022) (.022) (.022) 
md1 -.008** -.008** -.009** -.007** -.007** -.009** 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
md2 .023** .023** .023** .022** .021** .022** 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
md3 .020** .021** .020** .021** .021** .021** 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
md4 -.022** -.021** -.021** -.021** -.021** -.020** 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
lnMETROPOP -.103** -.103** -.102** -.117** -.117** -.117** 
 (.035) (.035) (.035) (.035) (.035) (.035) 
lnPCINC -.405** -.405** -.405** -.392** -.392** -.393** 
 (.031) (.031) (.031) (.031) (.031) (.031) 
       
F-Stat 324.09 343.1 324.09 343.1 342.17 329.69 
R-Squared 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 
Number of Units 369,413 369,413 369,413 369,413 369,413 369,413 
Standard errors in parentheses; * Significant to the .05 level; ** Significant to the .01 level. 
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The most significant detractor to the theory is the coefficient on the certainty variables, 
which were consistently positive: both certainty variables had positive coefficients when 
significant in the regressions.  This is a direct contradiction of the theory that demand 
uncertainty, not certainty, will raise dispersion.  
The other surprises include the coefficients on the percent direct variable, the dummy 
indicating presence of low cost carriers, and two of the lagged merger dummy variables.  All 
were expected to be negative, yet all came out significantly positive.  With regards to the 
percdir variable, it is entirely possible that the greater the percentage of direct flights in a 
market, the greater the probability of business travelers making purchases, which would 
certainly drive up dispersion.   
The estimated coefficient on the indicator variable for low cost carrier presence on a route 
is somewhat harder to explain.  There was a concern that the low cost indicator variable was 
correlated with the “low cost as a share of route traffic” variable.  Including both in the 
regressions produced opposite signs on the coefficients.  Yet, when the regressions were run 
with each variable individually, the signs and significance remained consistent for each.  This 
suggests that the mere presence of a low cost carrier on a route indicates sufficiently large 
traffic on that route, which warrants entry by low cost competition.  Hence, as an indirect 
way to indicate the extent of competition on a route, the low cost carrier indicator would 
likely garner a positive coefficient.  However, as the share of the market borne by low cost 
carriers increases, the cost effect appears to overwhelm the competition effect, resulting in 
decreasing dispersion.   
Finally, the two lagged merger dummy variables that were surprisingly positive came in 
the t-2 and t-3 time periods.  In order to understand why, it is best to view all four merger 
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dummy variables together.  If a merger was completed exactly one quarter or one year ago, 
that event has had a significant negative impact on dispersion.  If a merger occurred exactly 
two or three quarters ago, that event has had a significant positive impact on dispersion.  A 
likely explanation for this discrepancy lies in the certainty result reported earlier: when 
markets are less certain, dispersion falls.  This would imply that the opposite is also true: 
when markets are more certain, dispersion rises.  Combining this with the concept of a 
merger leads to the following observation: a merger, ceteris paribus, reduces certainty in the 
first full quarter immediately following completion of the merger.  Such an environment 
would lead to less confident price discrimination by those firms remaining in the new, less 
certain market, which would imply less dispersion.  As the first full quarter of data is 
accumulated in this new environment, airlines gain confidence in their ability to price 
accordingly, leading to more discrimination in the subsequent period and, as a result, more 
dispersion.  A similar logic would explain why the coefficient on the MD4 variable for 
merger activity one year ago was also negative.53 
The most significant determinant of Gini dispersion is the regionalshare variable.  All 
significance figures that follow are based on a one standard deviation change in the value of 
the independent variable in question.  For example, a one standard deviation change in the 
percent of traffic carried by regional carriers leads to a 13% decline in Gini dispersion.  This 
is plausible, since regional carriers are often monopolistic on seldom traveled “spoke” routes.  
The next most significant are changes lowcostshare, percdir, and monopoly, which result in a 
5% decrease, a 4.5% increase, and a 4% decrease in Gini dispersion, respectively.   
                                                 
53
 We have to assume that the next observation in such a sequence, MD8, is positive rather than test for it, since 
to do so would require giving up four more degrees of freedom. 
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The linear in the logs estimation of Gini dispersion yields very similar results.  Regional 
share is the most influential as a one standard deviation change in regional share leads to an 
expected decrease in Gini of 76%.  Such increases in percdir lead to an expected increase in 
Gini of 22%, increases in monopoly lead to an expected decrease in Gini of 20%, and 
increases in the share of traffic carried by low cost airlines lowers the Gini 17%.   
   
Average Fare 
The results for the average fare regressions are given in tables 11 and 12 below.  While 
most of the coefficients fall well within the realm of expectations, two important exceptions 
warrant additional attention.  The first regards the merger dummy variables.  Without 
exception, in the two equations, all of the significant merger dummy variables show negative 
impacts on the average fare paid in affected markets.  This suggests the possibility that 
mergers lead to efficiency gains that are large enough to make up for any resulting increases 
in market power.   
The second exception, the monopoly dummy variable, is harder to explain.  This variable 
is significantly negative in each of the linear in the logs estimations, suggesting that markets 
served by monopolies have lower average fares than those characterized by any other level of 
competition.  Not only does this result contradict logical expectations, it does not seem to fit 
with the significant positive coefficients on the herfindahl variables.  Nor does it seem to be a 
result of monopoly markets being poorer, smaller, and more prone to change-of-plane 
service.  Although these things would suggest lower fares, they are accounted for in the 
regressions through use of pc income, population, and percent direct variables. 
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One possible explanation for this negative coefficient is that monopolized airline routes 
might be considered natural monopolies: regardless of the benefits derived from competition, 
the cost advantage of going from two airlines to one is unambiguously large.  Two planes, 
two sets of pilots, two sets of ground crews, higher advertising costs, and other redundancies 
are present with competition.  A monopoly eliminates this collective cost burden, enabling 
the remaining airline to simultaneously lower prices while increasing profit margins.54  If 
true, this might help explain why increased concentration tends to raise average fares right up 
to the moment of monopoly, at which point the cost advantages kick in and start reducing 
fares. 
Another explanation concerns the markets that happen to be monopolies.  In looking at the 
data, there appear to be a tremendous number of very small, very unlikely markets among the 
monopolistic markets.  While the full list is exhaustive,55 examples include routes like TPA-
DLH (Tampa, Fl – Duluth, MN), TOL-JAN (Toldeo, OH – Jackson, MS), SYR-TRI 
(Syracuse, NY – Johnson City, TN).  It is plausible to think that many of these routes were 
made possible by the hub-spoke system that developed with deregulation.  Not only is it 
possible that demand is so low for many of these markets that lower prices are warranted, but 
it is also very possible that many of the passengers flying on obscure routes are using 
frequent flyer discounts to do so. 
Regardless of the reason, the magnitude of the effect is small, and it is only significant in 
the linear in the logs regressions.  A one standard deviation change in the monopoly variable 
leads to a 3% decrease in price.  This, along with the certainty variables, is among the lower 
determinants of average fares.  The biggest impacts come from the population, regional 
                                                 
54
 Profit margins will rise if price falls as long as average costs fall further. 
55
 Monopolies comprise 25% of all markets, which is roughly 5800 markets. 
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share, percent direct, and lowcostshare variables.  One standard deviation changes in each of 
the first three lead to 105%, 60%, and 59% increases, respectively, while a one standard 
deviation change in lowcostshare lowers average fares by 21%.  As for mergers, a one 
standard deviation change in merger activity causes an expected decrease in average fares of 
17-24%.  
In any event, while costs, concentration, and perhaps even certainty raise average fares, 
mergers and monopolies appear to be unambiguously associated with lower average fares.  
These are important results, since they imply that, overall, airline mergers have resulted in 
enough efficiency gains to overwhelm and outweigh any potentially adverse market power 
enhancements.  Further, these results are in direct contrast with the majority of the papers 
cited above.  As mentioned earlier, a likely explanation for the divergence of results is the 
vastly expanded data set and regressors used in the present study, including but not limited to 
the percent of direct traffic statistics. 
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Table 11: 
Regression Output: Linear Average Fare 
 
  Avgfpm Regressions With Herfindahl Avgfpm Regressions With Monopoly 
 and the Following Certainty Variables: and the Following Certainty Variables: 
  qtq and yoy qtq only yoy only qtq and yoy qtq only yoy only 
herf 1.119** 1.122** 1.126** - - - 
 (.078) (.078) (.077)    
monopoly - - - -.046 -.040 -.049 
    (.041) (.041) (.041) 
knownqtq -.066** -.062** - -.077** -.069** - 
 (.017) (.017)  (.017) (.017)  
knownyoy .020 - .005 .041 - .024 
 (.019)  (.019) (.019)  (.019) 
regional -.150 -.152 -.142 -.222** -.227** -.214** 
 (.083) (.083) (.083) (.083) (.083) (.083) 
alaska -1.746** -1.742** -1.756** -1.828** -1.820** -1.840** 
 (.616) (.616) (.616) (.616) (.616) (.616) 
premium -1.045 -1.046 -1.041 -.940 -.941 -.934 
 (.667) (.667) (.667) (.667) (.667) (.667) 
percdir 6.069** 6.068** 6.068** 6.216** 6.215** 6.215** 
 (.124) (.124) (.124) (.123) (.123) (.123) 
REALfuelcost -.275** -.273** -.278** -.315** -.309** -.319** 
 (.029) (.028) (.029) (.029) (.028) (.029) 
REALnonfuelcost .841** .843** .841** .831** .835** .831** 
 (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) 
lowcost -.473** -.475** -.470** -.558** -.562** -.556** 
 (.044) (.044) (.044) (.044) (.044) (.044) 
lowcostshare -1.228** -1.229** -1.234** -1.199** -1.200** -1.205** 
 (.191) (.191) (.191) (.191) (.191) (.191) 
regionalshare 2.968** 2.972** 2.962** 2.851** 2.859** 2.842** 
 (.376) (.376) (.376) (.377) (.377) (.377) 
md1 -.692** -.694** -.675** -.674** -.679** -.654** 
 (.048) (.048) (.047) (.047) (.047) (.047) 
md2 -.416** -.420** -.420** -.404** -.411** -.408** 
 (.039) (.039) (.039) (.039) (.039) (.039) 
md3 -.742** -.746** -.746** -.733** -.741** -.738** 
 (.036) (.036) (.036) (.036) (.035) (.036) 
md4 -.097** -.101** -.102** -.082 -.091** -.088* 
 (.037) (.037) (.037) (.037) (.037) (.037) 
metropop(1,000,000s) -2.812** -2.811** -2.817** -2.801** -2.799** -2.808** 
 (.187) (.187) (.187) (.187) (.187) (.187) 
REALpcinc($1,000s) .304** .304** .304** .310** .310** .310** 
 (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) 
       
F-Stat 695.13 735.79 734.4 680.58 720.05 718.99 
R-Squared 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 
Number of Units 373,856 373,856 373,856 373,856 373,856 373,856 
Standard errors in parentheses; * Significant to the .05 level; ** Significant to the .01 level. 
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Table 12: 
Regression Output: Linear in the Logs Average Fare 
 
  lnAVGFPM Regressions With lnHERF lnAVGFPM Regressions With Monopoly 
 and the Following Certainty Variables: and the Following Certainty Variables: 
  qtq and yoy qtq only yoy only qtq and yoy qtq only yoy only 
lnHERF .024** .024** .024** - - - 
 (.002) (.002) (.002)    
monopoly - - - -.016** -.016** -.016** 
    (.002) (.002) (.002) 
knownqtq -.003** -.002** - -.003** -.002** - 
 (.001) (.001)  (.001) (.001)  
knownyoy .001 - .000 .002** - .002* 
 (.001)  (.001) (.001)  (.001) 
regional .010** .009** .010** .006 .006 .006 
 (.004) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
alaska -.152** -.152** -.152** -.156** -.156** -.157** 
 (.026) (.026) (.026) (.026) (.026) (.026) 
premium -.041 -.042 -.041 -.036 -.036 -.036 
 (.025) (.025) (.025) (.025) (.025) (.025) 
percdir .299** .299** .299** .305** .305** .305** 
 (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) 
lnFUELCOST -.059** -.058** -.059** -.063** -.062** -.063** 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
lnNONFUELCOST .419** .420** .419** .413** .415** .412** 
 (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) 
lowcost -.025** -.025** -.025** -.030** -.030** -.029** 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
lowcostshare -.058** -.058** -.058** -.057** -.057** -.057** 
 (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) 
regionalshare .073** .073** .073** .068** .068** .067** 
 (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) 
md1 -.036** -.036** -.035** -.035** -.035** -.034** 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
md2 -.026** -.026** -.026** -.025** -.026** -.025** 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
md3 -.039** -.039** -.039** -.038** -.039** -.038** 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
md4 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
lnMETROPOP -.211** -.211** -.212** -.211** -.211** -.212** 
 (.021) (.021) (.021) (.021) (.021) (.021) 
lnPCINC .373** .373** .374** .383** .383** .384** 
 (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) 
       
F-Stat 715.85 757.72 756.53 711.44 752.65 751.95 
R-Squared 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 
Number of Units 373,856 373,856 373,856 373,856 373,856 373,856 
Standard errors in parentheses; * Significant to the .05 level; ** Significant to the .01 level.
  
 
CHAPTER VIII 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS: FIRST-DIFFERENCES REGRESSIONS 
 
Tables 13-17 show the first-difference regression results.  Although the variables used in 
the first-difference regressions are intended to correspond closely to those used in the fixed-
effects regressions, it should be noted that the fuel cost and non-fuel cost variables drop out 
of the first difference equations.  This is because these time-specific variables do not vary 
across markets.  As a result, the first-differencing process generates identical changes in fuel 
and nofuel costs across markets, which therefore do not affect the dependent variables. 
 
The Effects of Mergers and Concentration 
Mergers and concentration are expected to raise average fares and reduce dispersion.  
While the fixed effects results reported earlier suggest that high concentration and mergers 
are associated with lower dispersion, the first difference regressions indicate that mergers 
increase dispersion.  Specifically, markets with high levels of merger activity are shown to 
exhibit greater increases in dispersion over the full period of 1986 through 1990 than markets 
with little merger activity.  In addition, although the pooled first difference regression results 
are mixed, the straight and modified first difference regressions support the theory that 
mergers should result in higher prices.  This is counter to the fixed effects results.  
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The Effects of Uncertainty 
Using the number of changes in competition as a proxy for uncertainty in the first 
difference regressions produces results in line with the fixed effects model.  Dispersion falls 
with uncertainty while average fares rise.  In the modified first difference regressions, 
markets experiencing greater numbers of changes also witnessed larger changes to average 
fares.  This is probably related to the effects of mergers on changes in average fares, which 
tended to be increasing with merger activity: the more mergers in a market, the greater the 
expected change in average fare.   
In the straight first difference model, dispersion is found to clearly fall with increases in 
uncertainty, providing more evidence counter to the theory.  Average fare is found to 
increase with uncertainty just like it was in the panel data models. 
The uncertainty results for the pooled first difference model are mixed.  Quarterly 
uncertainty appears to raise dispersion while lowering fares, while year-over-year uncertainty 
does the opposite.   
 
The Effects of Costly Capacity 
The interesting cost figure is the startingLOWCOSTshare variable, which is positively 
and significantly related to both dispersion and average fare.  Markets in which low cost 
carriers have high market shares are somehow prone to greater positive changes in dispersion 
over the full time period of 1986-1990.  This is perhaps counter to the theory that costs are 
positively related to dispersion and average fare: the higher the percentage of low cost 
carriers on a route, the lower the expected fares and dispersion.  One of the two following 
interpretations of this result is possible: either low cost carriers that come to dominate 
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markets are, over time, behaving more like monopolies (and thus raising average fares), or 
the remaining “high cost” carriers in markets dominated by low cost carriers increased the 
extent to which they served high-paying passengers over this time period.  Either way, these 
somewhat surprising results lend further evidence to the negative relationship obtained 
between lowcost shares and both average fares and dispersion in the fixed effects and first 
difference models. 
Table 13: 
Straight First-Difference Regression: Linear Dispersion (Without Dummies) 
 
  Cross Section Results: 
 Full Period Change in Dispersion 1986-1990 
 1st Period 2nd Period 3rd period 4th period 
 (1st Qtrs) (2nd qtrs) (3rd qtrs) (4th qtrs) 
  gini4yrCHG gini4yrCHG gini4yrCHG gini4yrCHG 
herf4yrchg -.080** -.074** -.071** -.066** 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
changesincomp -.003** -.001 -.002** -.003** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
percdir4yrCHG .032** .034** .027** .027** 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
lowcostshare4yrCHG -.031** -.031** -.048** -.031** 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.005) 
regshare4yrCHG -.036** -.018* .003 .015 
 (.010) (.008) (.008) (.009) 
mergers4yrTOTAL .005** .004** .003** .008** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
metropop4yrchg1000000sO .040** .029** .020** .026** 
 (.006) (.006) (.005) (.006) 
REALpcinc4yrchg1000sO .003** -.001 -.002** -.001* 
 (.001) (.000) (.000) (.001) 
     
F(  8, 23072) 108.62 97.15 103.25 75.82 
R-squared .036 .033 .035 .026 
Number of obs 23081 23081 23081 23081 
Standard errors in parentheses; * Significant to the .05 level; ** Significant to the .01 level. 
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Table 14: 
Modified First Difference Regression: Linear Dispersion (Without Dummies) 
 
  Cross Section Results: 
 Full Period Change in Dispersion 1986-1990 
 1st Period 2nd Period 3rd period 4th period 
 (1st Qtrs) (2nd qtrs) (3rd qtrs) (4th qtrs) 
  gini4yrCHG gini4yrCHG gini4yrCHG gini4yrCHG 
startingHERF .041** .025** .031** .016** 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
changesincomp(100s) -.012 .156** -.018 -.133* 
 (.061) (.058) (.055) (.055) 
percdir4yrCHG .024** .023** .016** .017** 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
startingLOWCOSTshare .054** .054** .059** .038** 
 (.004) (.003) (.004) (.004) 
startingREGIONALshare .017 -.012 -.033** -.047** 
 (.009) (.008) (.009) (.010) 
mergers4yrTOTAL(10s) .048** .017 .017 .060** 
 (.011) (.010) (.010) (.010) 
metropop4yrchg1000000sO .044** .031** .022** .027** 
 (.006) (.006) (.005) (.006) 
REALpcinc4yrchg10000sO .033** -.003 -.019** -.007 
 (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
     
F(  8, 23072) 61.91 47.13 59.05 25.33 
R-squared .021 .016 .020 .009 
Number of obs 23081 23081 23081 23081 
Standard errors in parentheses; * Significant to the .05 level; ** Significant to the .01 level. 
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Table 15: 
Straight First-Difference Regression: Linear Average Fare (Without Dummies) 
 
  Cross Section Results: 
 Full Period Change in Average Fare 1986-1990 
 1st Period 2nd Period 3rd period 4th period 
 (1st Qtrs) (2nd qtrs) (3rd qtrs) (4th qtrs) 
  avgfpm4yrCHG avgfpm4yrCHG avgfpm4yrCHG avgfpm4yrCHG 
herf4yrchg 2.937** 2.505** 1.856** 2.392** 
 (.243) (.225) (.210) (.219) 
changesincomp .231** .184** .128** .180** 
 (.048) (.043) (.040) (.039) 
percdir4yrCHG 4.317** 4.782** 4.456** 5.415** 
 (.325) (.308) (.279) (.294) 
lowcostshare4yrCHG -5.206** -4.825** -1.564** -2.501** 
 (.326) (.305) (.307) (.388) 
regshare4yrCHG 5.133** 3.539** -.164 4.039** 
 (.783) (.661) (.628) (.697) 
mergers4yrTOTAL .373** .668** .502** .221** 
 (.082) (.074) (.069) (.069) 
metropop4yrchg1000000sO -.680 -.647 -2.468** -.498 
 (.486) (.438) (.412) (.416) 
REALpcinc4yrchg1000sO -.053 -.036 .063 .077* 
 (.041) (.038) (.037) (.039) 
     
F(  8, 23072) 93.86 109.67 68.97 80.2 
R-squared .032 .037 .023 .027 
Number of obs 23081 23081 23081 23081 
Standard errors in parentheses; * Significant to the .05 level; ** Significant to the .01 level. 
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Table 16: 
Modified First Difference Regression: Linear Average Fare (Without Dummies) 
 
  Cross Section Results: 
 Full Period Change in Average Fare 1986-1990 
 1st Period 2nd Period 3rd period 4th period 
 (1st Qtrs) (2nd qtrs) (3rd qtrs) (4th qtrs) 
  avgfpm4yrCHG avgfpm4yrCHG avgfpm4yrCHG avgfpm4yrCHG 
startingHERF -.321 -.441 .482* -.661** 
 (.252) (.230) (.211) (.210) 
changesincomp .132** .076 .112** .099* 
 (.050) (.045) (.042) (.041) 
percdir4yrCHG 4.596** 5.060** 4.757** 5.740** 
 (.326) (.308) (.277) (.292) 
startingLOWCOSTshare 2.574** 3.022** -.344 .596 
 (.298) (.271) (.267) (.325) 
startingREGIONALshare -2.045* -.314 2.912** -.488 
 (.756) (.659) (.642) (.715) 
mergers4yrTOTAL .516** .790** .692** .270** 
 (.087) (.078) (.073) (.072) 
metropop4yrchg1000000sO -1.269** -1.171** -2.586** -.768 
 (.491) (.441) (.414) (.419) 
REALpcinc4yrchg1000sO -.029 -.008 .058 .089* 
 (.042) (.039) (.037) (.039) 
     
F(  8, 23072) 46.45 74.24 57.61 58.66 
R-squared .016 .025 .020 .020 
Number of obs 23081 23081 23081 23081 
Standard errors in parentheses; * Significant to the .05 level; ** Significant to the .01 level. 
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Table 17: 
Pooled First Difference Regressions: 
Linear Gini and Average Fare  
  Pooled First Difference Results: 
 Quarter-to-quarter Changes, 1986-1990 
 Dispersion Average Fare 
  gini lnGINI avgfpm lnAVGFPM 
     
herfCHG/lnHERF -.062** -.144** .233** -.006** 
 (.001) (.004) (.069) (.002) 
qtrchanges .001** .005** -.072** -.004** 
 (.000) (.002) (.021) (.001) 
yrchanges -.001** -.003 .122** .008** 
 (.000) (.002) (.021) (.001) 
percdir .030** .153** 7.570** .376** 
 (.002) (.009) (.106) (.005) 
lowcostshare -.034** -.148** .131 .006 
 (.003) (.017) (.196) (.009) 
regionalshare .005 .015 2.614** .062** 
 (.004) (.024) (.277) (.013) 
md1 .009** .037** -.679** -.027** 
 (.001) (.006) (.074) (.003) 
md4 -.007** -.027** .673** .038** 
 (.001) (.005) (.061) (.003) 
metropop1000000o/lnmetpopO .067** .315** -2.552** -.077 
 (.009) (.103) (.587) (.057) 
REALpcinc1000o/lnREALpcincO -.001* -.284** .272** .438** 
 (.000) (.074) (.026) (.042) 
winter .001 .008 .974** .030** 
 (.001) (.005) (.052) (.003) 
spring .012** .057** -.637** -.029** 
 (.000) (.002) (.027) (.001) 
summer .007** .032** .174** .004** 
 (.000) (.002) (.027) (.001) 
     
F( 13,373557) 438.31 227.32 893.63 812.23 
R-squared 0.02 0.008 0.03 0.0275 
Number of obs 373571 365362 373571 373571 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*Significant to the .05 level. 
** Significant to the .01 level. 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER IX 
CLOSING REMARKS ON EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Three main conclusions can be reached from this analysis.  First, the theory clearly 
predicts that dispersion should increase with competition, costs, and uncertainty.  Yet, in all 
of the fixed-effects and first difference regressions of Gini dispersion, the certainty variables 
show positive coefficients, suggesting that dispersion increases with certainty, not 
uncertainty.  These results call into question the appropriateness of applying this one key 
aspect of Dana’s theory to the airline industry, although it is important to note that the type of 
“uncertainty” described by Dana is slightly different from the kind used here. 
Second, markets that are directly affected by mergers are shown to have decreasing 
average fares in the four quarters following the merger, but higher average fares over the four 
year time period studied.  This seemingly contradictory result indicates that the long run 
impact of consolidation is more likely to be higher fares than the initial post-merger period 
suggests.  The short-term findings are also an important detraction from several empirical 
studies performed to date that show evidence of market power with mergers.  I believe the 
difference in the outcomes results from the previous studies having used less extensive data, 
omitted appropriate variables, and studied shorter post-merger time periods.  The two most 
appropriate types of variables left out of previous studies are certainty and percentage of 
direct traffic variables. 
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Third, the surprising result that monopolies are associated with lower average fares is 
obtained.  This provides evidence that mergers produce enough efficiency gains through 
economies of scale to outweigh abuse of pricing power, at least in the short run. 
Fourth, while the restrictions on the model seem somewhat unrealistic, the overall 
predictions of the model appear to be consistent with the empirical evidence from industry 
records.  With the exception of uncertainty, the results that dispersion rises with competition 
and costs are fairly well aligned with the data. 
In sum, an extensive analysis of the effects airline mergers have on the pricing practices in 
the airline industry constitutes an valuable step forward in understanding the nature and 
consequences of consolidation in all industries characterized by demand uncertainty and 
costly capacity or, at the very least, widespread dispersion.  The implications from this 
analysis may lead to a more equitable pricing environment, either through increased 
regulation by the DOJ, increased “self regulation” by the firms themselves electing not to 
abuse their power, or the acknowledgement by antitrust authorities that market concentration 
may actually benefit consumers in the case of the airline industry.  
 
  
 
  
 
CHAPTER X 
RE-EXAMINING THE ROLE OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
 
While the rigid assumptions of Dana’s model attempt to motivate the spirit behind airline 
pricing and, importantly, empirical results appear to justify the theoretical setup by 
corresponding to its predictions, the extremely complex model seems paradoxically 
oversimplified and unrealistic for the airline industry in a few crucial ways.  Specifically, the 
following six results/assumptions require critical examination: 1) dispersion is increasing 
with uncertainty, 2) uncertainty and prices are “rigid,” 3) demand shows up in random order, 
4) dispersion is increasing with costs, 5) dispersion is increasing with competition, and 6) 
residual demand is the primary mechanism through which the aforementioned results are 
obtained.  Each will be addressed in the following discussion. 
 
Does Dispersion Increase With Uncertainty? 
The first problem lies in the belief that demand uncertainty increases dispersion.  Oddly, 
although several empirical studies have followed the two prevailing theories on price 
dispersion in the airline industry,56 this is the first to openly question and empirically test the 
role of uncertainty.  But does uncertainty truly lead to greater dispersion?  While it may 
sound plausible given the cleanliness of Dana’s model, there appears to be a disconnect 
between the theoretical model and previous empirical studies as most empiricists jump 
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directly from the knowledge that price dispersion occurs in the airline industry to testing the 
extent of its influence.  In estimating the impact of uncertainty directly, the results obtained 
in this paper call into question the validity of this crucial theoretical result.   
Further, it needs to be acknowledged that the peak-load-pricing literature alone proves that 
Dana’s impressive modeling provides sufficient but not necessary conditions for price 
dispersion to arise, bringing up the obvious point that, even in situations of demand certainty, 
predictable, widespread, welfare-enhancing dispersion will occur.  Evidence abounds to this 
effect: pizzerias, movie theaters, cell phone service, and even airlines are a few examples.  In 
each situation, the producer’s desire to siphon price elastic consumers away from peak 
periods in which demand cannot be fully satisfied to off-peak periods in which capacity is 
underutilized is driven by the goal of increasing profits.  Among the many effects of this 
process is greater price dispersion.  Few would argue, however, that consumers are worse off 
as a result.  If Dana is correct, what he has introduced is ultimately an extension of our 
knowledge of price dispersion theory: any dispersion occurring for whatever reason may be 
exacerbated by uncertainty facing suppliers of costly, perishable goods.57   
Thus, societally beneficial dispersion occurs regardless of the level of uncertainty, and 
may in fact fall as uncertainty increases.58  
 
Are Uncertainty and Prices “Rigid?” 
It is assumed in the Dana model that uncertainty and prices are rigid.  Yet both of these 
assumptions seem to grossly disregard the actual pricing practices of airlines in reality.  For 
                                                                                                                                                       
56
 Dana’s theory of demand uncertainty and costly capacity is one of the two theories explaining airline price 
dispersion; the widely accepted Gale/Holmes theory of peak-load-pricing is the other. 
57
 Or it may be limited by uncertainty, as the empirical results of this paper suggest, depending on the industry. 
58
 Again, see the results of the above empirical study. 
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airline inventory managers, price is not “rigid” in any meaningful way.  Sales in any 
particular market are announced and ordinary prices are adjusted almost daily, sometimes 
even more frequently, in response to changing states of demand (real or perceived).  On this 
basis alone, the model’s assumption of price rigidity for airlines seems very unrealistic. 
Such pricing flexibility goes a long way towards mitigating the potentially adverse effects 
of demand uncertainty.  As a result, demand is rarely so uncertain that analysts lack a decent 
grasp of how to price their products.  This is due largely to the somewhat unique nature of 
how the product is sold: highly substitutable seats are allocated to different pricing classes 
325 days or so in advance of delivery, and sold on a first-come first-serve basis.59  It is also 
due to the somewhat unique nature of airline demand: the first people to buy tickets are the 
most price elastic (vacationers, retirees, etc) whereas the last people to buy tickets are the 
least price elastic (business travelers, bereavement passengers, etc).  Finally, the product 
changes very little year over year: a seat on a plane to get home for Thanksgiving is 
essentially the same thing year in, year out.  This enhances the ability to use historical data 
for an otherwise unchanged product to predict current and even future demand.60 
Since prices are highly malleable, the long window of sales allows managers to constantly 
adjust both prices and seat allocations as the true demand states unfold.  For example, if a 
manager allocates 15 seats for sale in the lowest fare class and those seats sell out faster than 
expected, he or she might adjust the prices, seat allocations, or both on the remaining 
capacity in order to reflect the updated, more certain, demand.  As long as the analyst in 
charge of the market in question responds diligently to demand that deviates from 
                                                 
59
 Concert tickets are similarly sold, although the location of your seat at a concert is a very subjective product.  
Airline seats are largely substitutable. 
60
 Such product stability is not inherent in most industries.  Fashion, for example, is always changing, and is not 
clearly delineated by date as the airline industry.  
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expectations, any downside risk – in terms of lost pricing power – to initially incorrect 
projections is small and easily correctible.61  This is the case regardless of how uncertain 
demand was at the initial opening of sales.62  Hence, it seems fair to question the 
appropriateness of using such rigid assumptions as price rigidity and demand uncertainty 
when modeling airline pricing. 
 
Does Demand “Show Up” in Random Order? 
Another crucial assumption of the model is that customers show up in random order.  
This, too, does not quite seem to fit the airline industry.  It is easily argued, if not widely 
acknowledged, that highly elastic leisure travelers seeking the lowest possible prices for their 
trips show up very early on in the booking cycle, relatively less flexible “wedding-type” 
travelers with more of a “need” for a particular flight show up next,63 and extremely 
inflexible business travelers show up last.   
While individual customers are difficult or impossible to identify ex ante, there are clearly 
group-based consumer attributes that provide a strong indication of demand at various 
junctures during the course of ticket sales.  Indeed, one of the most commonly imposed 
segmentation methods employed by airlines is a time-dependent mechanism that restricts 
seat/fare availability based on the number of days prior to departure: flights purchased within 
seven days of departure are the most expensive, flights purchased between seven and twenty-
one days of departure are less expensive, and flights purchased more than twenty-one days 
                                                 
61
 The process has 325 days or so to unfold, due to the advance-planning nature of the industry.   
62
 In other words, whether or not the competition has been seen before, “demand shocks” do occur and are 
accounted for. 
63
 Wedding travelers, reunion attendees, fickle vacationers, etc, often don’t have the benefit of knowing the 
dates of travel until the events approach.  As such, they have less time, less flexibility, and fewer travel options 
– not to mention inflexible destinations – all of which increase willingness to pay for seats. 
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prior to departure are the least expensive.  Airlines presumably set their ticket distinctions at 
these intervals because they reflect consumers’ general tendencies relatively well.  At the 
same time, consumers, in aggregate, know that time prior to departure matters when buying 
their tickets.  This knowledge not only allows, but inspires, highly elastic consumers to seek 
tickets as far in advance of departure as possible.   
Business travelers, on the other hand, are essentially powerless in their desires to buy 
cheaper seats long before departure since they don’t know where they’ll need to be until a 
few days prior to the trip.  This is the case despite their understanding of airline pricing 
policies.  As a result, the issue of residual demand that ostensibly arises because some high 
demand customers are able to purchase their tickets at low prices – simply because they 
randomly show up when cheap seats still exist – is largely defused before it has a chance to 
materialize.  Such is the nature of demand segmentation in the airline industry. 
 
Is Dispersion Increasing With Costs? 
The empirical results of this paper and others like it suggest that the dispersion indeed 
increases with costs.  Yet the idea of “costly capacity” should not be misinterpreted as a 
unique characteristic of airline-type industries.  As with demand uncertainty, costly capacity 
as a strict requirement for, let alone determinant of, price dispersion is also a constraint faced 
in every industry.  Retailers of all stripes have limited shelf space that is difficult to increase 
in the short run.  Professional contractors (plumbers, tree surgeons, electricians, etc) have 
little ability to increase their output beyond their own capacity constraints (hours per day, 
number of stump grinders, skilled laborers employed).  And manufacturers face a classic 
increasing marginal cost of production beyond full capacity: worker overtime pay.  In each 
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case, capacity costs are arguably high, or at least existent, and increase rapidly under short-
term conditions of surging demand.  Any cost-based results for the airline industry might 
thus be generalized to hold for all industries. 
 
Is Dispersion Increasing With Competition? 
Dana suggests that dispersion is increasing with competition.  The regression results offer 
mixed evidence: mergers are shown to raise dispersion while increases in concentration are 
shown to lower it.  Fare levels fall with mergers and monopolies but rise with concentration. 
Note that this does not help clear up any confusion concerning the blurry line between 
“normal” price dispersion and monopolistic price discrimination.  Microeconomic theory has 
long suggested that airlines perform various types of intentional price discrimination, at least 
one of which can be viewed as both dispersion and discrimination.64  A brief look at standard 
academic textbooks65 reveals alternating, sometimes vague applications of price 
discrimination theory to the airline industry: first degree, second degree,66 peak load pricing, 
and other classifications.67  Yet many introductory texts seem hesitant to pinpoint the exact 
type of dispersion employed, and for good reason: the pricing of airline tickets seems too 
complex to warrant a definitive, one-size-fits-all classification. 
Nonetheless, a more thorough discussion of the role of competition on dispersion is 
presented below. 
 
 
                                                 
64
 Peak Load Pricing is clearly a deliberate attempt to extract consumer surplus while simultaneously aiding 
consumers as a whole through expanded service that otherwise would not be cost-effective. 
65
 Introductory Texts provide a generalized explanation; Industrial Organization texts are more explicit. 
66
 Waldmen and Jensen (2001) characterize the airline industry as 2nd degree price discrimination. 
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How Important Is Residual Demand? 
While it has been established that dispersion occurs in several aforementioned industrial 
situations, dispersion certainly appears to be large in the airline industry,68 both in terms of 
spread about the mean and the number of actual prices paid for an otherwise identical 
product.69  This must be explained by at least one aspect of the airline industry that 
distinguishes it from others.  The Dana model argues that the relevant distinction is residual 
demand: coupling an expensive, time-expiring seat with uncertainty as to the revelation of 
the true demand state ostensibly leads airlines to vary prices in an effort to maximize their 
expected profit under the opposing likelihoods that each state occurs.  As already 
acknowledged, this model creates the result that dispersion increases with competition.   
Yet residual demand as a concept seems limited to special cases of oligopoly in which an 
entrant commandeers a portion of the incumbent’s demand.  The remaining demand facing 
the incumbent(s) after entry occurs is considered residual, and the main implication is that 
pricing power falls.  Note that dispersion would likely fall as competition increases, since 
each residual demand curve resulting from entry becomes flatter with each subsequent 
entrant.  Further, it seems odd to portray demand curves as “shrinking” when one group or 
another purchases a product, regardless of their reservation price.  For example, if I were to 
buy a limited edition DVD, the demand curve doesn’t really shift left by one unit with my 
purchase, given the tiny proportion of demand that I represent.   
Finally, while it might be appropriate to use residual demand in the event that consumers 
show up in the manner described by Dana, the airline industry does not seem to exhibit this 
                                                                                                                                                       
67
 Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2001) hint at 1st degree tactics, but decline to categorize it for airline pricing. 
68
 Anecdotal as though the evidence may be, such thoughts presumably inspire studies of this industry. 
69
 It is assumed for the present discussion that a seat purchased a month in advance is identical to one purchased 
an hour in advance.   
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characteristic.  This industry does, however, exhibit a mechanically similar tendency on the 
supply side.  Thus, a model with a more realistic necessary assumption might be one that 
focuses on residual supply instead of residual demand.   
 
Reconsidering the Role of Price Discrimination 
“Residual supply” is a concept that I define analogously to residual demand, and is based 
on the following intuition.  One very important characteristic that sets the airline industry 
apart from most others is the nature of the product’s planned expiration (so to speak): output 
and capacity are announced well in advance of delivery, at which point the selling 
commences.  This structural fact, coupled with the tendency of more price-elastic consumers 
to purchase items first, enables the airline to employ a sort of “reverse inter-temporal price 
discrimination.”  Inter-temporal price discrimination allows firms, particularly in rapidly 
changing industries like fashion and technology, to charge high initial prices to eager, 
inelastic consumers before lowering prices for more elastic consumers who, by definition, 
arrive later.70  Airlines, in contrast, must employ radically different pricing tactics that enable 
them to extract as high a profit margin as possible on the tail end of production.  While the 
mechanics are similar, the resulting dispersion seems to be much greater and appears to 
conform to both first-degree and “reverse” inter-temporal price discrimination policies.71  
Thus, while residual demand might be a sufficient condition for determining some amount of 
dispersion under such a scenario, it is not necessary and may, in fact, be incorrectly applied. 
                                                 
70
 See Stokey (1979) for more on inter-temporal price discrimination theory or Xie and Shugan (2001) for an 
example of such pricing in retailing. 
71
 Not to mention peak-load pricing 
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Residual supply, on the other hand, is a characteristic of the airline industry72 that may 
more thoroughly explain the price dispersion found therein.  From the moment seats are 
allocated to a flight,73 the number available for sale declines by one with each seat 
subsequently sold.74  In addition, due to characteristics like gate capacity constraints, limited 
aircraft interchangeability, and FAA regulations, overall short-term capacity is unlikely to 
shift in response to greater-than-expected demand once the flights in a market are set.75  
Accordingly, supply can be viewed as continually shrinking, or shifting left, with each 
subsequent sale.  Thus, I define the remaining capacity available for sale as the residual 
supply.  When this occurs against the backdrop of a fairly stable, fairly certain demand 
curve,76 one can quickly observe increasing prices for each subsequent ticket sold as the seats 
available for sale – the last of which are available just prior to takeoff – continually match 
with the remaining consumers according to each consumer’s willingness to pay. 
Since the demand curve is “normal” in the sense that it is downward sloping (i.e., more 
elastic as price falls and quantity increases), the structural nature of residual supply provides 
the airlines with a wonderful mechanism through which to extract continually more surplus 
from every subsequent consumer as the time prior to delivery approaches zero.  It might be 
argued that this environment provides the purest, most powerful example of first degree price 
discrimination found in traditional markets in our economy.77  It also might be argued that a 
                                                 
72
 “Residual Supply” is much less common than residual demand.  Airline, Hotel, Rental Cars have it. 
73
 “Seat allocation” means the number of seats allocated to be sold at each fare/restriction level. 
74
 A one seat reduction in supply is significant when a typical flight has 120 or so seats available. 
75
 This is the basis for a rapidly increasing marginal cost curve once the capacity constraint is reached. 
76
 Unlike other studies of dispersion that consider the costs of information seeking (see Dahlby and West, 
1986), it is assumed here that pricing information is readily, cheaply, and easily obtained by airline consumers. 
77
 Auction markets like Ebay enable sellers to extract surplus as well, but on a case-by-case basis that often 
leaves potential demand unsatisfied. 
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continually shrinking supply in the face of any normal demand curve would lead to the same 
result, regardless of the varying nature of demand.78 
This sort of thinking has significant implications on the interpretation of price dispersion 
in the airline industry.  Peak-load-pricing has long been considered to be a key pricing tactic 
that enabled airlines to expand output at lower costs than otherwise, servicing a much 
broader portion of demand at lower prices while extracting greater amounts of surplus from 
inelastic consumers.  Yet it may be argued that peak-load-pricing is just another mechanism 
through which first degree price discrimination is achieved.  Nonetheless, the concept and 
practice of peak load pricing seem much more palatable to those concerned with the welfare 
of airline consumers. 
James Dana further complicated the issue by suggesting price dispersion results from 
forces entirely out of the control of the firms who wield it: demand uncertainty.  The 
conclusion is that dispersion in fact is more pronounced as the level of competition increases.  
This is the key result that seems to justify the argument, as price dispersion resulting from 
monopolistic exploitation of inelastic demand has long been the driving force behind 
dispersion.  The opposite result is somewhat startling. 
There is, however, a problem with this theory.  It obscures price discrimination as the 
primary cause of dispersion in the airline industry.  Coupled with the previously determined 
idea that uncertainty is actually much less of an issue for airlines than elsewhere, we will 
now revisit the instinctive causes of discrimination-based price dispersion. 
It may be argued that the bulk of airline price dispersion comes from highly sophisticated, 
deliberate pricing tactics employed by the airlines.  Competition confuses the process to a 
                                                 
78
 Airline demand seems to increase as departure approaches; even if the demand curve were steady, continually 
shrinking supply would produce dispersed pricing, albeit not so dramatically. 
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certain extent, and may result in greater dispersion.79  A simple example of how this might 
occur comes from the following definitional difference between monopoly and competition: 
monopolies restrict output, competitive firms do not.  In order to satisfy the ambitions of 
expanded capacity, the firms involved will undoubtedly need to lower prices at the tail end of 
the demand curve.  Since a basic tenet of classical economic theory is that, ceteris paribus, 
monopolies neither expand output as aggressively as nor lower prices as far as firms in 
competition do, the resulting disparity of fares will be greater under competition.80   In 
addition, while each airline has a fairly good idea of the demand it faces through years of 
data accumulation, surveys, census information, etc, the monopolist has greater control over 
the pricing decisions.  The main uncertainty introduced by competition, in this case, is the 
possibility of a fare war that does not otherwise occur.   
Uncertainty is further reduced by the restricted output enjoyed by monopolies because 
monopolists are more likely to sell their entire inventory.  This reduces the likelihood of last-
minute offerings of bargain or stand-by fares, which are common in all airline markets.  In 
either case, uncertainty and dispersion would increase with competition.  Xie and Shugan 
(2001) use capacity constraints to further support the idea that concentration lowers 
dispersion by arguing that constrained capacity raises the value of advance purchase sales, 
allowing the seller to charge a premium on such sales.  If monopolies constrain capacity 
more than competitive firms, their argument is consistent with the observation that 
concentration leads to lower dispersion. 
Another way competition might positively influence dispersion is the creative destruction 
nature of intense airline competition.  Since deregulation, there has been a very noticeable 
                                                 
79
 Competitive impacts on price dispersion are a component of price dispersion, and may not be conclusive. 
80
 The upper range of fares should be similar for monopolistic and competitive firms with similar costs.  
 98 
difference between the established carriers and the startups.81  While accurate cost 
information is difficult to estimate and nearly impossible to acquire, startups are typically 
viewed as having vastly lower cost structures due to a variety of characteristics that 
distinguish them from the majors.82  This would suggest that, ceteris paribus, every time a 
startup enters a market to compete with a major, they push the supply curve out further than 
the major would be willing to satisfy.  Their lower marginal and average cost of production 
enables them to sell seats at lower prices than were previously available.   
There is, however, a problem with this analysis: all firms in such a situation – majors and 
startups alike – continue to employ first degree price discrimination tactics as subsequent 
sales shift their individual and, consequently, collective supply curves to the left.  This 
shouldn’t ultimately impact the marginal value (i.e. sale price) of the last few units sold, 
since those consumers willing to pay high prices for such walkup seats are willing to do so 
precisely because they don’t know they want them until they walk up to the counter (and find 
them in scarce supply).  Thus, as low-cost competition increases, low-priced capacity 
expands, the quantity of airline tickets sold at lower prices increases, and, although the 
highest fares don’t necessarily change, the average price of all tickets sold will fall.   
Both of these results – that low cost entry increases dispersion while decreasing average 
fares – are verified in the empirical analysis conducted earlier in this study.  However, the 
extent of the low cost carrier presence in a market also matters in determining dispersion.  
The empirical analysis shows that overall market dispersion falls with increasing 
concentration of flights provided by low cost carriers.  
                                                 
81
 “Established” refers to the major airlines in existence during regulation, like United and American.  
“Startups” refers to those airlines that emerged after deregulation (like Jet Blue) or shortly prior to (Southwest).  
In the latter case, Southwest played a role in forcing deregulation. 
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This all points towards the following conclusion: cost, in addition to level of competition, 
is a primary determinant of dispersion when residual supply influences pricing decisions.  
Moreover, the effects appear to influence each other: competition will increase dispersion 
more if the cost differential between carriers is great than if costs are similar across carriers 
in a market.  As a result, it is possible to have two seemingly contradictory positive 
influences on dispersion: greater competition from a low cost carrier can increase dispersion 
while lower competition resulting from efficiency-enhancing mergers can also increase 
dispersion.  While imperfect, support for this premise is provided by the empirical results 
reported above.   
The best way to motivate this theory is to compare the pricing outcomes between markets 
with different levels of competition facing identical demand curves.  As per the above 
discussions, it is assumed that the demand curve is known by all sellers in a market.  For 
expositional purposes, it is also assumed that the demand curve is linear.  Further, the 
analysis will pertain to a single days’ worth of airline flights in a single market: a flight 
scheduled for departure at some time t in the future83 is a different product than a flight 
scheduled for time t + 1.  Different times on the same day are assumed to be equivalent.  I 
begin with the presence of “competition,” which is defined as two or more firms 
simultaneously operating in a market. 
Generally speaking, when there are two or more price-taking competitors in a market, the 
market supply curve is comprised of the horizontal summation of the individual firms’ 
marginal cost curves.  If the representative firm’s average cost is less than price, output 
expansion will occur as new firms enter the market.  This results in a rightward shift of 
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 Low levels of unionization, streamlined fleets, quicker turnaround, etc – all of which serve to lower the 
marginal cost of producing an airline seat.  
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market supply and a corresponding decrease in market clearing prices.  Entry stops once the 
market clearing price equals the average cost for the representative firm.   
Assuming our market is full and entry no longer occurs, pricing and sales commence.  The 
initial price offered for sale is the lowest possible price in this market.  Once a seat is sold at 
this price, the individual and market supply curves shift slightly leftward, resulting in a new, 
residual supply curve.  The interaction of this residual supply with market demand leads to a 
new, higher equilibrium price for the next seat sold.  This process continues indefinitely until 
all seats are sold. 
If this market were instead being served by a monopolist with a marginal cost structure 
identical to the market summation of the competitive cost curves, the mechanics would be 
very similar, except that the monopolist’s marginal cost curve would interact directly with 
the market demand.  Unlike the single-price charging monopolist who charges prices higher 
than marginal cost, first-degree price discriminating monopolists charge prices equal to 
marginal cost.  Thus, the initial market clearing price will be the same under monopoly as 
under competition.  Once that seat sells, the interaction of the new residual supply curve with 
the market demand curve will lead to a higher price for the next seat.  This process is 
repeated until the last seat is sold. 
Under conditions of identical costs, the dispersion of fares will approximate first-degree 
price discrimination in each situation, and should be roughly equal (with more fare levels 
being offered by the competitive market simply as a function of slightly differentiated inter-
firm prices at every stage of market clearing).  In reality, this cost condition seems 
unrealistic.  Ceteris paribus, a single carrier serving a market with capacity x will have lower 
marginal costs than the combined costs of four carriers, each of which serves the market with 
                                                                                                                                                       
83
 “t” is measured in days. 
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capacity x/4.  For example, a monopolist can lower gate, fuel, pilot, and other costs by using 
one, two, or even three planes instead of four.  They may also enjoy lower advertising costs 
as well as lower average fixed costs associated with overhead.  In short, it seems reasonable 
to conclude that monopolistic markets will be served, in the long run, by carriers with lower 
cost structures than competitive markets.  This will have a significant impact on dispersion as 
the monopolist will expand output to reflect the lower cost structure.  Amidst a stationary 
demand curve, the net result is a decrease in the lowest price they are willing to charge to the 
first consumer who buys that first seat.  Once the selling begins, the same process as before 
produces a gradually decreasing residual supply curve resulting in higher and higher prices 
for each seat subsequently sold.  Therefore, a monopolistic airline market with lower costs 
will have lower initial fares, lower average fares, and greater dispersion than a competitive 
airline market facing identical demand conditions.   
This analytical conclusion, while not explicitly modeled, seems to fit nicely with the 
empirical results obtained in this paper.  While I found that dispersion is negatively 
associated with concentration, I found that it tends to increase with mergers, suggesting that 
efficiency gains are significant in merger situations.  This corresponds to the results that 
average fares fall with mergers, suggesting that efficiency gains lower the threshold of 
discount fares without reducing the pricing power on the tail end of sales.  Finally, the 
surprisingly negative coefficient on the monopoly dummy variable furthers the point. 
All of this supports the premise that higher costs associated with numerous carriers 
serving a market decreases competition’s ability to lower initial fares below those offered by 
the low cost monopolist, potentially driving prices up and dispersion down with competition.  
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A formal model of this outcome will be developed as the primary directive of a future 
research project.  
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Appendix A: 
Regression Results for Alternative Specifications 
 
The following eight tables contain regression results to be compared with the results 
presented in the paper.  They do not include coefficients on the quarter dummy variables, 
although quarter dummies were used when regressions are identified as being “with Quarter 
Dummies.”  Standard errors are included in parenthesis, * denotes significant to the .05 level, 
and ** denotes significant to the .01 level. 
 
 
Fixed Effects Regressions: 
 
The fixed-effects regressions that follow are different from those in the paper in the 
following ways: 
 
1) They are run with quarterly dummy variables to account for time trends. 
2) They include quadratic market demand regressors for population and income. 
3) Comparison Tables 1A – 4A exclude standard errors in order to fit on the page. 
 
 
First-Difference Regressions: 
 
The first-difference regressions that follow are different from those in the paper in the 
following ways:  
 
1) The independent variables used are intended to correspond as closely as possible to 
those used in the fixed-effects regressions. 
2) They include quadratic market demand regressors for population and income.   
 
 
Appendix Table Corresponds to Table Found on 
9-A 9 page 69 
10-A 10 page 70 
11-A 11 page 76 
12-A 12 page 77 
13-A 13 page 80 
14-A 14 page 81 
15-A 15 page 82 
16-A 16 page 83 
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Comparison Table 1-A 
 Gini Fixed Effects Results 
  Linear Quadratic Quadratic with Quarter Dummies 
herf -.056**   -.056**  -.056**   
monopoly   -.031**  -.031**   -.031** 
knownqtq(100s) .075* .181** .070** .175** .050* .154** 
knownyoy(100s) -.031 .046 -.036 .042 -.021 .060* 
regional .006** .007** .005** .006** .006** .007** 
alaska .001 .000 .001 .000 -.005 -.007 
premium -.006 -.008 -.006 -.008* -.009* -.011** 
percdir .028** .019** .028** .019** .027** .019** 
REALfuelcost .021** .021** .020** .020**   
REALnonfuelcost .007** .007** .007** .007   
lowcost .005** .007** .004** .007** .003** .005** 
lowcostshare -.013** -.014** -.013** -.014** -.009** -.010** 
regionalshare -.014** -.012** -.014** -.011** -.015** -.013** 
md1 -.004** -.004** -.003** -.003 .002** .002** 
md2 .003** .003** .004** .004** -.002** -.003** 
md3 .003** .003** .004** .004** -.001* -.001** 
md4 -.006** -.006** -.006** -.006** -.003** -.003** 
metropop1,000,000sO .017** .016** .002 -.001 .005 .003 
metropop1,000,000sD     .019** .017** .022** .021** 
metropopOsq     .003** .003** .002** .003** 
metropopDsq     .002** .003** .002** .003** 
metropop1,000,000sOxD     -.002** -.002** -.003** -.003** 
REALpcinc100,000sO -.220** -.217** -.432** -.411 -.130 -.096 
REALpcinc100,000sD     -.383** -.375 -.082 -.061 
REALpcincOsq     .005** .005* .004** .003* 
REALpcincDsq     .006** .005** .004** .004** 
REALpcinc100,000sOxD     -.003 -.002 -.002 -.002 
           
F-Stat 560.19 568.65 403.76 410.03 458.93 460.96 
R-Squared 0.519 0.521 0.52 0.521 0.53 0.53 
Number of Units 373856 373856 373856 373856 373856 373856 
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Comparison Table 2-A 
 Linear in the Logs Gini Fixed Effects Results 
  Linear Quadratic 
Quadratic with 
Quarter Dummies 
lnHERF -.136**   -.136**  -.134**  
monopoly  -.144**  -.144**  -.143** 
knownqtq .001 .007** .001 .006** .000 .005** 
knownyoy -.003 .002 -.003* .002 -.002 .003 
regional .033** .037** .032** .035** .036** .039** 
alaska  .018 .005 .021 .007 -.005 -.020** 
premium -0.043 -.050* -.041 -.049* -.056** -.063** 
percdir .136** .092** .136** .092** .132** .088** 
lnFUELCOST .191** .194** .185** .189**   
lnNONFUELCOST .381** .369** .390** .379**   
lowcost .029** .041** .028** .040** .021** .032** 
lowcostshare -.045** -.049** -.046** -.049** -.029 -.031* 
regionalshare -.088** -.076** -.085** -.073** -.091** -.079** 
md1 -.008** -.007** -.006* -.004 .018** .019** 
md2 .023** .022** .024** .023** -.002 -.004 
md3 .020** .021** .021** .022** -.002 -.001 
md4 -.022** -.021** -.021** -.020** -.006* -.005 
lnmetpopO -.103** -.117** -.037 -.050 -.078* -.084* 
lnmetpopD    .048 .036 .008 .002 
lnmetpopOsq    .077** .076** .086** .086** 
lnmetpopDsq    .109** .109** .117** .118** 
lnmetpopOxD    -.079** -.072** -.085** -.079** 
lnREALpcincO -.405** -.392** -.196 -.135 -.757 -.667 
lnREALpcincD    -.999* -1.011* -1.562** -1.544** 
lnREALpcincOsq    -.142 -.181* -.039 -.071 
lnREALpcincDsq    -.013 -.040 .091 .070 
lnREALpcincOxD    .257 .319* .317* .359** 
         
F-Stat 324.09 343.1 244.95 250.12 276.09 277.98 
R-Squared 0.46 0.46 0.457 0.4591 0.4634 0.4655 
Number of Units 369413 369413 369413 369413 369413 369413 
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Comparison Table 3-A 
Average Fare Fixed Effects Results 
  Linear Quadratic Quadratic with Quarter Dummies 
herf 1.119**   1.095**  1.039**   
monopoly   -.046  -.062   -.081* 
knownqtq -.066** -.077** -.061** -.071** -.070** -.079** 
knownyoy .020 .041 .028 .049** .020 .042* 
regional -.150 -.222** -.111 -.182* -.206** -.276** 
alaska  -1.746** -1.828** -1.812** -1.895** -1.651** -1.736** 
premium -1.045 -.940 -1.229 -1.139 -1.065 -.978 
percdir 6.069** 6.216** 6.061** 6.203** 6.101** 6.235** 
REALfuelcost -.275** -.315** -.168** -.206**   
REALnonfuelcost .841** .831** .773** .762**   
lowcost -.473** -.558** -.445** -.531** -.379** -.461** 
lowcostshare -1.228** -1.199** -1.152** -1.123** -1.375** -1.346** 
regionalshare 2.968** 2.851** 2.899** 2.784** 2.962** 2.851** 
md1 -.692** -.674** -.806** -.788** -.895** -.881** 
md2 -.416** -.404** -.482** -.469** -.260** -.247** 
md3 -.742** -.733** -.740** -.730** -.497** -.483** 
md4 -.097** -.082 -.047 -.030 -.146** -.130** 
metropop1000000sO -2.812** -2.801** -3.664** -3.642** -5.177** -5.139** 
metropop1000000sD     -2.365** -2.375** -3.879** -3.873** 
metropopOxO     -.002 -.009 .039 .031 
metropopDxD     -.056 -.061* -.014 -.020 
metropopOxD1000000s     .301** .325** .398** .420** 
REALpcinc1000sO .304** .310** .481** .480** -.147* -.148* 
REALpcinc1000sD     .426** .424** -.199** -.201** 
REALpcincOxO     -.008** -.008** -.003** -.003** 
REALpcincDxD     -.006** -.006** -.002 -.002 
REALpcinc1000sOxD     .007** .008** .009** .009** 
           
F-Stat 695.13 680.58 511.9 502.16 452.03 445.2 
R-Squared 0.78 0.78 0.778 0.778 0.78 0.78 
Number of Units 373856 373856 373856 373856 373856 373856 
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Comparison Table 4-A 
 
Linear in the Logs Average Fare Fixed Effects Results 
  Linear Quadratic 
Quadratic with 
Quarter Dummies 
lnHERF .024**   .022**  .021**  
monopoly  -.016**  -.018**  -.018** 
knownqtq -.003** -.003** -.003** -.003** -.003** -.003** 
knownyoy .001 .002** .002 .003** .001 .003** 
regional .010** .006 .010** .006 .005 .002 
alaska  -.152** -.156** -.153** -.158** -.140** -.145** 
premium -.041 -.036 -.053* -.049* -.041 -.036 
percdir .299** .305** .299** .304** .302** .307** 
lnFUELCOST -.059** -.063** -.045** -.049**   
lnNONFUELCOST .419** .413** .409** .402**   
lowcost -.025** -.030** -.029** -.033** -.025** -.029** 
lowcostshare -.058** -.057** -.054** -.053** -.067** -.066** 
regionalshare .073** .068** .076** .071** .078** .073** 
md1 -.036** -.035** -.035** -.034** -.037** -.036** 
md2 -.026** -.025** -.022** -.021** -.008** -.007** 
md3 -.039** -.038** -.032** -.032** -.019** -.018** 
md4 .001 .001 .009** .010** .002 .003 
lnmetpopO -.211** -.211** -.195** -.193** -.327** -.322** 
lnmetpopD    -.101** -.101** -.234** -.232** 
lnmetpopOsq    .024** .027** .002 .005 
lnmetpopDsq    .043** .045** .022** .024** 
lnmetpopOxD    .161** .166** .174** .178** 
lnREALpcincO .373** .383** -1.259** -1.299** -1.545** -1.573** 
lnREALpcincD    -2.079** -2.121** -2.370** -2.401** 
lnREALpcincOsq    .124** .126** .044 .047 
lnREALpcincDsq    .258** .260** .179** .183** 
lnREALpcincOxD    .198** .208** .309** .312** 
         
F-Stat 715.85 711.44 548.07 546.32 542.63 541.95 
R-Squared 0.81 0.81 0.8112 0.8112 0.8153 0.8153 
Number of Units 373856 373856 373856 373856 373856 373856 
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Comparison Table 5-A 
Straight First-Difference Gini Comparisons: With and Without Dummy Changes 
 1st Period 2nd Period 3rd Period 4th Period 
 gini4yrCHG gini4yrCHG gini4yrCHG gini4yrCHG 
herf4yrchg -.078** -.037** -.073** -.039** -.070** -.031** -.065** -.034** 
 -(.003) -(.004) -(.003) -(.004) -(.003) -(.004) -(.003) -(.004) 
monopoly4yrCHG  -.031**  -.028**  -.033**  -.025** 
  -(.002)  -(.002)  -(.002)  -(.002) 
changesincomp -.003** -.004** -.001** -.002** -.002** -.003** -.003** -.003** 
(10s) -(.001) -(.001) -(.001) -(.001) -(.001) -(.001) -(.001) -(.001) 
regional4yrCHG  .003  -.098*  .036  .089** 
(10s)  (.040)  (.036)  (.035)  (.036) 
alaska4yrCHG  -.045  .025*  -.007  -.009 
  (.025)  (.011)  (.011)  (.011) 
premium4yrCHG  -.030  -.041  -.038  -.041* 
  (.023)  (.022)  (.023)  (.021) 
percdir4yrCHG .034** .028** .035** .029** .029** .021** .028** .023** 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
lowcost4yrCHG .032 .238 -.335 -.128 -.051 .010 .787** .833** 
 .217 .219 .193 .195 .184 .186 .208 .212 
lowcostshare4yrCHG -.032** -.035** -.027** -.030** -.048** -.049** -.045** -.045** 
 (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.006) (.006) 
regshare4yrchg -.033** -.029** -.017* -.007 .001 -.005 .012 .000 
 (.010) (.011) (.008) (.010) (.008) (.010) (.009) (.011) 
mergers4yrTOTAL .003** .003** .002 .001 .001 .002 .007** .007** 
(10s) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
metropop4yrchgO .024** .025** .017 .016 -.007 -.005 .021* .020* 
 (.010) (.010) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) 
metropop4yrchgD .003 .004 .020* .021* .004 .005 .017 .017 
 (.010) (.010) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) 
metropop4yrchgOxO .002* .002* .001 .001 .003** .003** .000 .001 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
metropop4yrchgDxD .004** .004** .002** .002** .003** .003** .000 .000 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
metropop4yrchgOxD -.001 .000 .003 .003* .001 .002 -.002 -.001 
 (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
REALpcinc4yrchgO -.005* -.005* -.010** -.010** -.007** -.008** -.012** -.012** 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
REALpcinc4yrchgD -.007** -.007** -.014** -.013** -.012** -.012** -.009** -.009** 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
REALpcinc4yrchgOxO .017** .016** .018** .017** .013** .012** .023** .022** 
(100s) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.004) 
REALpcinc4yrchgDxD .018** .017** .023** .022** .020** .019** .021** .020** 
(100s) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.004) 
REALpcinc4yrchgOxD -.012* -.011* -.009 -.008 -.015** -.011* -.015* -.012 
(100s) (.006) (.006) (.005) (.005) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) 
F( 16, 23064) 64.4 64.43 61 61.77 62.63 66.98 43.38 41.18 
R-squared 0.043 0.06 0.041 0.058 0.042 0.063 0.029 0.04 
Number of obs 23081 23081 23081 23081 23081 23081 23081 23081 
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Comparison Table 6-A 
Straight First-Difference Avgfpm Comparisons: With and Without Dummy Changes 
 1st Period 2nd Period 3rd period 4th period 
  Avgfpm4yrCHG Avgfpm4yrCHG Avgfpm4yrCHG Avgfpm4yrCHG 
herf4yrchg 2.701** 3.016** 2.376** 2.154** 1.826** 1.627** 2.346** 3.374** 
 (.248) (.328) (.229) (.294) (.213) (.272) (.221) (.280) 
monopoly4yrCHG  -.237  .197  .171  -.859** 
  (.164)  (.149)  (.140)  (.145) 
Changesincomp .245** .243** .163** .159** .154** .150** .187** .186** 
 (.049) (.049) (.044) (.044) (.041) (.041) (.040) (.040) 
regional4yrCHG  .125  .688*  .563*  .647* 
  (.330)  (.286)  (.269)  (.265) 
alaska4yrCHG  .086  -1.427  -1.912*  -3.422** 
    (.836)  (.852)  (.826) 
premium4yrCHG  -1.360  -5.076**  -8.215**  -5.230** 
    (1.771)  (1.758)  (1.562) 
percdir4yrCHG 4.232** 4.186** 4.703** 4.717** 4.440** 4.432** 5.429** 5.207** 
 (.325) (.327) (.309) (.311) (.280) (.282) (.295) (.297) 
lowcost4yrCHG -.851** -.842** -.495** -.557** -.050 -.088 -.130 -.110 
 (.177) (.180) (.153) (.155) (.140) (.142) (.155) (.158) 
Lowcostshare -3.922** -3.938** -4.039** -3.962** -1.505** -1.453** -2.276** -2.285** 
4yrCHG (.424) (.426) (.387) (.388) (.374) (.374) (.459) (.459) 
regshare4yrchg 5.096** 4.936** 3.624** 2.829** -.112 -.752 4.076** 3.450** 
 (.784) (.915) (.662) (.785) (.630) (.762) (.698) (.828) 
mergers4yr .424** .424** .640** .641** .556** .554** .226** .233** 
TOTAL (.086) (.086) (.078) (.078) (.073) (.073) (.072) (.072) 
metropop4yrchg .020 -.003 -.730 -.822 -2.931** -3.116** -1.042 -1.213 
O (Origin) (.805) (.807) (.724) (.726) (.678) (.679) (.682) (.682) 
metropop4yrchg .433 .420 1.358 1.224 -1.464* -1.681** -1.181 -1.329* 
D (Destination) (.808) (.809) (.728) (.730) (.681) (.682) (.685) (.685) 
metropop4yrchg -.083 -.082 .005 .005 .074 .078 .063 .069 
OxO (.067) (.067) (.060) (.060) (.057) (.057) (.057) (.057) 
metropop4yrchg -.140* -.141* -.123* -.119* .016 .022 .075 .082 
DxD (.067) (.067) (.061) (.061) (.057) (.057) (.057) (.057) 
metropop4yrchg .128 .148 .118 .174 .099 .191 .126 .195 
OxD (.122) (.124) (.110) (.111) (.103) (.105) (.104) (.105) 
REALpcinc4yrchg .232 .231 -.067 -.079 .903** .874** .592** .565** 
O (.200) (.200) (.195) (.195) (.200) (.200) (.220) (.220) 
REALpcinc4yrchg .175 .174 -.178 -.192 .713** .685** .400 .375 
D (.199) (.199) (.194) (.194) (.199) (.199) (.219) (.219) 
REALpcinc4yrchg .000 .000 -.002 -.002 -.010** -.010** -.004 -.005 
OxO (.003) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
REALpcinc4yrchg .001 .001 .001 .001 -.006** -.006** -.002 -.002 
DxD (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.003) 
REALpcinc4yrchg -.008 -.008 .005 .006 -.006 -.005 -.008 -.006 
OxD (.004) (.005) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.005) (.005) 
F( 16, 23064) 46.23 37.55 52.78 43.58 35.53 30.3 38.84 34.62 
R-squared .033 .033 .037 .038 .026 .027 .028 .031 
Number of obs 23081 23081 23081 23081 23081 23081 23081 23081 
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Table 9-A 
Fixed Effects Regression Output for Linear Gini Dispersion With Quarter Dummies 
  Gini Regressions With Herfindahl Gini Regressions With Monopoly 
 
and the Following Certainty 
Variables: 
and the Following Certainty 
Variables: 
  
qtq and 
yoy qtq only yoy only 
qtq and 
yoy qtq only yoy only 
herf -.056** -.056** -.056**    
 (.001) (.001) (.001)    
monopoly    -.031** -.031** -.031** 
    (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Knownqtq(100s) .050* .046*  .154** .165**  
 (.020) (.024)  (.024) (.024)  
Knownyoy(100s) -.021  -.095 .060*  .094** 
 (.027)  (.027) (.027)  (.027) 
regional .006** .006** .006** .007** .007** .007** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
alaska -.005 -.006 -.005 -.007 -.007 -.006 
 (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) 
premium -.009* -.009* -.009* -.011** -.011** -.011** 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
percdir .027** .027** .027** .019** .019** .019** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
lowcost .003** .003** .003** .005** .005** .005** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
lowcostshare -.009** -.009** -.009** -.010** -.010** -.010** 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
regionalshare -.015** -.015** -.015** -.013** -.013** -.012** 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
md1(10s) .015** .016** .014* .015** .015** .012* 
 (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) 
md2(10s) -.022** -.021** -.022** -.025** -.026** -.024** 
 (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
md3(10s) -.012* -.012* -.012* -.012** -.014** -.012* 
 (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
md4(10s) -.025** -.025** -.025** -.025** -.026** -.024** 
 (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
metropop10,000,000sO .054 .054 .054 .032 .033 .033 
 (.054) (.054) (.054) (.054) (.054) (.054) 
metropop10,000,000sD .223** .223** .224** .208** .208** .209** 
 (.053) (.053) (.053) (.053) (.053) (.053) 
metropopOsquared(10s) .025** .025** .025** .027** .027** .027** 
 (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
metropopDsquared(10s) .024** .024** .024** .026** .026** .025** 
 (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
metropopOxD10,000,000s -.030** -.030** -.030** -.030** -.031** -.030** 
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 (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) 
REALpcinc10,000sO -.013 -.013 -.013 -.010 -.010 -.010 
 (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) 
REALpcinc10,000sD -.008 -.008 -.008 -.006 -.006 -.007 
 (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) 
REALpcincOsquared(1000s) .037** .037** .037** .031* .032* .032* 
 (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) 
REALpcincDsquared(1000s) .043** .043** .043** .039** .040** .040** 
 (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) 
REALpcinc1,000,000sOxD -.023 -.023 -.023 -.019 -.020 -.019 
 (.025) (.025) (.025) (.025) (.025) (.025) 
       
F( 39,350451) 458.93 470.99 470.76 460.96 472.93 472.48 
R-squared 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 
Number of obs 373856 373856 373856 373856 373856 373856 
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Table 10-A 
Fixed Effects Regressions: Linear in the Logs Dispersion With Quarter Dummies 
 
  lnGINI Regressions With lnHERF lnGINI Regressions With Monopoly 
 
and the Following Certainty 
Variables: 
and the Following Certainty 
Variables: 
  qtq and yoy qtq only yoy only qtq and yoy qtq only yoy only 
lnHERF -.134** -.134** -.134** - - - 
 (.003) (.003) (.003)    
monopoly - - - -.143** -.143** -.143** 
    (.003) (.003) (.003) 
knownqtq(10s) .002 -.003 - .053** .058** - 
 (.013) (.013)  (.013) (.013)  
knownyoy(10s) -.024 - -.024 .026 - .037 
 (.015)  (.015) (.015)  (.015) 
regional .036** .036** .036** .039** .039** .038** 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
alaska -.005 -.005 -.005 -.020 -.019 -.019 
 (.041) (.041) (.041) (.041) (.041) (.041) 
premium -.056** -.056** -.056** -.063** -.063** -.064** 
 (.023) (.023) (.023) (.022) (.022) (.022) 
percdir .132** .132** .132** .088** .088** .088** 
 (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
lowcost .021** .021** .021** .032** .032** .032** 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
lowcostshare -.029 -.029 -.029 -.031* -.032* -.031* 
 (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) 
regionalshare -.091** -.091** -.091** -.079** -.079** -.079** 
 (.022) (.022) (.022) (.022) (.022) (.022) 
md1 .018** .018** .018** .019** .018** .017** 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
md2 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.004 -.004 -.003 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
md3 -.002 -.001 -.002 -.001 -.002 -.001 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
md4 -.006* -.006* -.006* -.005 -.005* -.004 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
lnmetpopO -.078* -.077* -.078* -.084* -.085* -.084** 
 (.037) (.037) (.037) (.037) (.037) (.037) 
lnmetpopD .008 .009 .008 .002 .001 .003 
 (.037) (.037) (.037) (.037) (.037) (.037) 
lnmetpopOsq .086** .086** .086** .086** .086** .086** 
 (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) 
lnmetpopDsq .117** .116** .117** .118** .118** .118** 
 (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) 
lnmetpopOxD -.085** -.084** -.085** -.079** -.080** -.078** 
 (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) 
lnREALpcincO -.757 -.755 -.757 -.667 -.669 -.679 
 (.492) (.492) (.492) (.490) (.490) (.490) 
lnREALpcincD -1.562** -1.560** -1.563** -1.544** -1.547** -1.556** 
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 (.500) (.500) (.500) (.499) (.499) (.499) 
lnREALpcincOsq -.039 -.040 -.039 -.071 -.070 -.069 
 (.075) (.075) (.075) (.075) (.075) (.075) 
lnREALpcincDsq .091 .089 .091 .070 .071 .071 
 (.076) (.076) (.076) (.076) (.076) (.076) 
lnREALpcincOxD .317* .319* .317* .359** .357** .360** 
 (.145) (.145) (.145) (.145) (.145) (.145) 
       
F( 39,346008) 276.09 283.35 283.21 277.98 285.23 285.13 
R-squared 0.4634 0.4634 0.4634 0.4655 0.4655 0.4655 
Number of obs 369413 369413 369413 369413 369413 369413 
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Table 11-A 
Fixed Effects Regression Output for Linear Average Fare With Quarter Dummies 
  Avgfpm Regressions With Herfindahl Avgfpm Regressions With Monopoly 
 and the Following Certainty Variables: and the Following Certainty Variables: 
  qtq and yoy qtq only yoy only qtq and yoy qtq only yoy only 
herf 1.039** 1.042** 1.046**    
 (.077) (.077) (.077)    
monopoly    -.081* -.075 -.085* 
    (.041) (.041) (.041) 
knownqtq -.070** -.066**  -.079** -.071**  
 (.017) (.017)  (.017) (.017)  
knownyoy .020  .005 .042*  .024 
 (.019)  (.019) (.019)  (.019) 
regional -.206** -.208** -.197* -.276** -.280** -.267** 
 (.082) (.082) (.082) (.082) (.082) (.082) 
alaska -1.651** -1.647** -1.661** -1.736** -1.727** -1.748** 
 (.617) (.617) (.617) (.618) (.617) (.618) 
premium -1.065 -1.065 -1.059 -.978 -.977 -.971 
 (.668) (.668) (.669) (.669) (.669) (.669) 
percdir 6.101** 6.100** 6.099** 6.235** 6.234** 6.234** 
 (.124) (.124) (.124) (.123) (.123) (.123) 
lowcost -.379** -.381** -.375** -.461** -.465** -.458** 
 (.044) (.044) (.044) (.044) (.044) (.044) 
lowcostshare -1.375** -1.375** -1.380** -1.346** -1.347** -1.352** 
 (.190) (.190) (.190) (.190) (.190) (.190) 
regionalshare 2.962** 2.966** 2.955** 2.851** 2.859** 2.842** 
 (.374) (.374) (.374) (.375) (.375) (.375) 
md1 -.895** -.898** -.879** -.881** -.886** -.863** 
 (.049) (.049) (.049) (.049) (.049) (.049) 
md2 -.260** -.263** -.264** -.247** -.255** -.252** 
 (.041) (.041) (.041) (.041) (.041) (.041) 
md3 -.497** -.501** -.501** -.483** -.491** -.487** 
 (.038) (.038) (.038) (.038) (.038) (.038) 
md4 -.146** -.150** -.151** -.130** -.138** -.136** 
 (.038) (.038) (.038) (.038) (.038) (.038) 
metropop1000000sO -5.177** -5.177** -5.181** -5.139** -5.139** -5.143** 
 (.332) (.332) (.332) (.332) (.332) (.332) 
metropop1000000sD -3.879** -3.879** -3.887** -3.873** -3.872** -3.883** 
 (.327) (.327) (.327) (.327) (.327) (.327) 
metropopOsquared .039 .039 .039 .031 .031 .031 
 (.029) (.029) (.029) (.029) (.029) (.029) 
metropopDsquared -.014 -.014 -.014 -.020 -.020 -.019 
 (.029) (.029) (.029) (.029) (.029) (.029) 
metropopOxD1000000s .398** .396** .397** .420** .417** .419** 
 (.042) (.042) (.042) (.042) (.042) (.042) 
REALpcinc1000sO -.147* -.148* -.146* -.148* -.149* -.146* 
 (.072) (.072) (.072) (.072) (.072) (.072) 
REALpcinc1000sD -.199** -.200** -.197** -.201** -.202** -.199** 
 (.072) (.072) (.072) (.072) (.072) (.072) 
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REALpcincOsquared -.033** -.033** -.033** -.033** -.033** -.034** 
(10s) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) 
REALpcincDsquared -.016 -.016 -.016 -.016 -.016 -.016 
(10s) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) 
REALpcinc10000sOxD .089** .089** .089** .091** .091** .091** 
 (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) 
       
F( 39,350451) 452.03 463.82 463.5 445.2 456.65 456.5 
R-squared 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 
Number of obs 373856 373856 373856 373856 373856 373856 
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Table 12-A 
Fixed Effects Regressions: Linear in the Logs Average Fare With Quarter Dummies 
 
  
Avgfpm Regressions With 
Herfindahl 
Avgfpm Regressions With 
Monopoly 
 
and the Following Certainty 
Variables: 
and the Following Certainty 
Variables: 
  qtq and yoy qtq only yoy only qtq and yoy qtq only yoy only 
lnHERF .021** .021** .021**    
 (.002) (.002) (.002)    
monopoly    -.018** -.018** -.018** 
    (.002) (.002) (.002) 
knownqtq(10s) -.032** -.030**  -.033** -.028**  
 (.008) (.008)  (.008) (.008)  
knownyoy(10s) .012  .004 .027**  .019 
 (.009)  (.009) (.009)  (.009) 
regional .005 .005 .006 .002 .001 .002 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
alaska -.140** -.140** -.141** -.145** -.145** -.146** 
 (.026) (.026) (.026) (.026) (.026) (.026) 
premium -.041 -.041 -.041 -.036 -.036 -.036 
 (.025) (.025) (.025) (.025) (.025) (.025) 
percdir .302** .302** .302** .307** .307** .307** 
 (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) 
lowcost -.025** -.025** -.025** -.029** -.029** -.029** 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
lowcostshare -.067** -.067** -.068** -.066** -.066** -.066** 
 (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) 
regionalshare .078** .078** .078** .073** .074** .073** 
 (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) 
md1 -.037** -.037** -.036** -.036** -.036** -.035** 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
md2 -.008** -.008** -.008** -.007** -.007** -.007** 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
md3 -.019** -.019** -.019** -.018** -.018** -.018** 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
md4 .002 .002 .002 .003 .002 .003 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
lnmetpopO -.327** -.327** -.327** -.322** -.323** -.323** 
 (.023) (.023) (.023) (.023) (.023) (.023) 
lnmetpopD -.234** -.234** -.235** -.232** -.232** -.232** 
 (.023) (.023) (.023) (.023) (.023) (.023) 
lnmetpopOsq .002 .002 .002 .005 .005 .005 
 (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) 
lnmetpopDsq .022** .022** .022** .024** .024** .024** 
 (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) 
lnmetpopOxD .174** .173** .173** .178** .177** .178** 
 (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) 
lnREALpcincO -1.545** -1.546** -1.538** -1.573** -1.575** -1.565** 
 (.283) (.283) (.283) (.283) (.283) (.283) 
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lnREALpcincD -2.370** -2.371** -2.362** -2.401** -2.404** -2.393** 
 (.285) (.285) (.285) (.285) (.285) (.285) 
lnREALpcincOsq .044 .044 .042 .047 .049 .046 
 (.043) (.043) (.043) (.043) (.043) (.043) 
lnREALpcincDsq .179** .179** .178** .183** .184** .182** 
 (.044) (.044) (.044) (.044) (.044) (.044) 
lnREALpcincOxD .309** .308** .309** .312** .310** .312** 
 (.081) (.081) (.081) (.081) (.081) (.081) 
       
F( 39,350451) 542.63 556.7 556.51 541.95 555.72 555.85 
R-squared 0.8153 0.8153 0.8153 0.8153 0.8153 0.8153 
Number of obs 373856 373856 373856 373856 373856 373856 
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Table 13-A 
Straight First-Difference Regression: Quadratic, Dispersion Without Dummies 
  Cross Section Results: 
 Full Period Change in Dispersion 1986-1990 
 1st Period 2nd Period 3rd period 4th period 
 (1st Qtrs) (2nd qtrs) (3rd qtrs) (4th qtrs) 
  gini4yrCHG gini4yrCHG gini4yrCHG gini4yrCHG 
herf4yrchg -.078** -.073** -.070** -.065** 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
changesincomp -.003** -.001** -.002** -.003** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
percdir4yrCHG .034** .035** .029** .028** 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
lowcostshare4yrCHG -.032** -.032** -.049** -.032** 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.005) 
regshare4yrchg -.033** -.018* .001 .014 
 (.010) (.008) (.008) (.009) 
mergers4yrTOTAL .003** .002 .001 .007** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
metropop4yrchg10000000sO .244** .166 -.065 .210* 
 (.099) (.092) (.089) (.092) 
metropop4yrchg10000000sD .025 .205* .044 .175 
 (.099) (.092) (.089) (.092) 
metropop4yrchg10sOxO .019* .009 .029** .005 
 (.008) (.008) (.007) (.008) 
metropop4yrchg10sDxD .038** .019** .029** .004 
 (.008) (.008) (.007) (.008) 
metropop10s4yrchgOxD -.011 .025 .011 -.015 
 (.015) (.014) (.014) (.014) 
REALpcinc4yrchg10000sO -.054* -.103** -.072** -.116** 
 (.025) (.025) (.026) (.030) 
REALpcinc4yrchg10000sD -.068** -.136** -.122** -.094** 
 (.024) (.025) (.026) (.029) 
REALpcinc4yrchg100sOxO .017** .018** .013** .023** 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.004) 
REALpcinc4yrchg100sDxD .018** .023** .020** .021** 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.004) 
REALpcinc4yrchg100sOxD -.012* -.009 -.015** -.016* 
 (.006) (.005) (.006) (.006) 
     
F( 16, 23064) 64.4 61 62.63 43.38 
R-squared .043 .041 .042 .029 
Number of obs 23081 23081 23081 23081 
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Table 14-A 
Modified First Difference Regression: Quadratic, Dispersion Without Dummies 
  Cross Section Results: 
 Full Period Change in Dispersion 1986-1990 
 1st Period 2nd Period 3rd period 4th period 
 (1st Qtrs) (2nd qtrs) (3rd qtrs) (4th qtrs) 
  gini4yrCHG gini4yrCHG gini4yrCHG gini4yrCHG 
startingHERF .041** .026** .032** .017** 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
changesincomp(10s) -.007 .011 -.004 -.016** 
 (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) 
percdir4yrCHG .026** .024** .019** .018** 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
startingLOWCOSTshare .054** .051** .056** .036** 
 (.004) (.003) (.004) (.004) 
startingREGIONALshare .015 -.012 -.030** -.045** 
 (.009) (.008) (.009) (.010) 
mergers4yrTOTAL(10s) .029** -.009 .001 .052** 
 (.011) (.010) (.010) (.010) 
metropop4yrchg1000000sO .031** .018* -.003 .023** 
 (.010) (.009) (.009) (.009) 
metropop4yrchg1000000sD .010 .023** .009 .021* 
 (.010) (.009) (.009) (.009) 
metropop4yrchgOxO(10s) .018* .011 .029** .005 
 (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) 
metropop4yrchgDxD(10s) .037** .021** .029** .003 
 (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) 
metropop4yrchgOxD(10s) -.010 .026 .012 -.017 
 (.015) (.014) (.014) (.014) 
REALpcinc4yrchg10000sO -.035 -.083** -.057* -.120** 
 (.025) (.025) (.027) (.030) 
REALpcinc4yrchg10000sD -.047 -.116** -.106** -.100** 
 (.025) (.025) (.026) (.030) 
REALpcinc4yrchgOxO(100s) .016** .016** .012** .023** 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.004) 
REALpcinc4yrchgDxD(100s) .017** .022** .019** .021** 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.004) 
REALpcinc4yrchgOxD(100s) -.015** -.011* -.015** -.013 
 (.006) (.006) (.006) (.007) 
     
F( 16, 23064) 42.07 35.84 39.7 18.17 
R-squared .028 .024 .027 .012 
Number of obs 23081 23081 23081 23081 
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Table 15-A 
Straight First-Difference Regression: Quadratic, Average Fare Without Dummies 
  Cross Section Results: 
 Full Period Change in Average Fare 1986-1990 
 1st Period 2nd Period 3rd period 4th period 
 (1st Qtrs) (2nd qtrs) (3rd qtrs) (4th qtrs) 
  avgfpm4yrCHG avgfpm4yrCHG avgfpm4yrCHG avgfpm4yrCHG 
herf4yrchg 2.929** 2.510** 1.838** 2.373** 
 (.243) (.225) (.210) (.219) 
changesincomp .241** .164** .154** .186** 
 (.049) (.044) (.041) (.040) 
percdir4yrCHG 4.278** 4.739** 4.442** 5.436** 
 (.325) (.309) (.280) (.295) 
lowcostshare4yrCHG -5.220** -4.810** -1.581** -2.482** 
 (.327) (.306) (.308) (.389) 
regshare4yrchg 5.104** 3.600** -.125 4.046** 
 (.784) (.662) (.629) (.697) 
mergers4yrTOTAL .402** .630** .556** .224** 
 (.086) (.078) (.073) (.072) 
metropop4yrchg1000000sO .058 -.739 -2.931** -1.044 
 (.805) (.724) (.678) (.682) 
metropop4yrchg1000000sD .464 1.359 -1.464* -1.185 
 (.808) (.728) (.681) (.685) 
metropop4yrchgOxO -.087 .006 .074 .063 
 (.067) (.060) (.057) (.057) 
metropop4yrchgDxD -.141* -.123* .015 .075 
 (.067) (.061) (.057) (.057) 
metropop4yrchgOxD .103 .097 .097 .121 
 (.122) (.109) (.103) (.104) 
REALpcinc4yrchg1000sO .222 -.068 .903** .591** 
 (.200) (.195) (.200) (.220) 
REALpcinc4yrchg1000sD .176 -.182 .713** .398 
 (.199) (.194) (.199) (.219) 
REALpcinc4yrchg100sOxO -.041 -.192 -.966** -.444 
 (.251) (.244) (.252) (.278) 
REALpcinc4yrchg100sDxD .088 .073 -.637** -.152 
 (.249) (.242) (.249) (.275) 
REALpcinc4yrchg100sOxD -.726 .531 -.631 -.767 
 (.450) (.434) (.442) (.481) 
     
F( 16, 23064) 47.63 55.4 37.75 41.23 
R-squared .032 .037 .026 .028 
Number of obs 23081 23081 23081 23081 
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Table 16-A 
Modified First Difference Regression: Quadratic, Average Fare Without Dummies 
  Cross Section Results: 
 Full Period Change in Average Fare 1986-1990 
 1st Period 2nd Period 3rd period 4th period 
 (1st Qtrs) (2nd qtrs) (3rd qtrs) (4th qtrs) 
  avgfpm4yrCHG avgfpm4yrCHG avgfpm4yrCHG avgfpm4yrCHG 
startingHERF -.335 -.425 .392 -.732** 
 (.253) (.231) (.212) (.211) 
changesincomp .142** .060 .133** .105** 
 (.050) (.046) (.042) (.041) 
percdir4yrCHG 4.544** 5.023** 4.730** 5.763** 
 (.327) (.309) (.278) (.293) 
startingLOWCOSTshare 2.613** 3.012** -.157 .745* 
 (.300) (.272) (.268) (.326) 
startingREGIONALshare -2.012** -.399 2.861** -.553 
 (.757) (.661) (.643) (.716) 
mergers4yrTOTAL .561** .776** .741** .277** 
 (.090) (.081) (.075) (.074) 
metropop4yrchg1000000sO -.581 -1.308 -3.004** -1.402* 
 (.813) (.730) (.681) (.688) 
metropop4yrchg1000000sD -.180 .767 -1.552* -1.628* 
 (.816) (.734) (.684) (.690) 
metropop4yrchgOxO -.082 .016 .064 .072 
 (.068) (.061) (.057) (.057) 
metropop4yrchgDxD -.138* -.113 .006 .090 
 (.068) (.061) (.057) (.058) 
metropop4yrchgOxD .045 .039 .076 .102 
 (.123) (.110) (.103) (.104) 
REALpcinc4yrchg1000sO .204 -.031 .844** .652** 
 (.202) (.196) (.201) (.221) 
REALpcinc4yrchg1000sD .150 -.146 .656** .474* 
 (.201) (.196) (.200) (.220) 
REALpcinc4yrchgOxO(100s) -.179 -.291 -.955** -.512 
 (.254) (.246) (.252) (.279) 
REALpcinc4yrchgDxD(100s) -.041 -.030 -.638** -.241 
 (.251) (.244) (.250) (.276) 
REALpcinc4yrchgOxD(100s) -.296 .712 -.474 -.787 
 (.454) (.437) (.443) (.483) 
     
F( 16, 23064) 24.19 37.66 31.93 30.87 
R-squared .017 .026 .022 .021 
Number of obs 23081 23081 23081 23081 
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Appendix B: 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
 
 
If PCAVG
MO
AVG PP > , then the following will hold: 
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Since γ > 1 and λ ∈ [0,1] by definition, this equality holds for all N, c, λ, and γ.  Hence, 
PC
AVG
MO
AVG PP > .  
 
 
If PCAVG
O
AVG PP > , then the following will hold: 
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[ ] [ ] 032)(32)( 2 >−+−+−+− ccNcNccNcN λλλλλγ  
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Since [ ]1,0∈λ , [ ]ccNcN 2,)23( −∈−− λλ , which is strictly positive, and  
[ ]cNcNcN 2,)23( +−∈−− λ , which is strictly positive, all terms in the above equation are 
> 0 .,, Ncλ∀  
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AVG PP > , then the following will hold: 
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Since N > c and Nλ > c by definition, the above inequality holds cN ,,λ∀ . 
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Appendix C: 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
 
 
If MOPC SDSD > , then the following will hold: 
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Now, inserting the equations for P1 = PPC and P2 = PMO, 
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Expanding the equation: 
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Since a) all constants are positive, b) N > c by definition, and c) Nλ –c > 0 in order to support 
high priced ticket allocations (otherwise, if Nλ – c < 0, no high priced seats are offered in 
either state and standard deviation is zero for both monopolies and competitive firms), the 
above inequality always holds. 
 
If MOO SDSD > , then the following will hold: 
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Both terms are positive, therefore the inequality holds .,, λcN∀  
 
If SDPC > SDO, then the following will hold: 
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Since N>c, Nλ>c, and λ is bound by [0,1], all terms in this equation are positive.  Therefore 
the entire equation is positive. 
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Appendix D: 
 
 
Endogeneity Issues 
Inclusion of the HHI requires extra discussion, as the construction of this variable raises 
some endogeneity questions.  At issue is the fact that the passenger data that produces the 
HHI variable is generated from the same pricing decisions by the firms operating in a market, 
creating feedback between the derived market structure variable, HHI, and the market 
conduct dependent variables of dispersion and average fare.  Given such endogeneity, 
consistent estimation would warrant inclusion of instrumental variables.  Yet, as 
Schmalensee discusses at length in the Handbook of Industrial Organization, valid exogenous 
instruments essentially cannot be found in such a situation.  He summarizes the issue of 
cross-sectional industrial analysis as one in which true instruments are very unlikely to be 
found, as all of the relevant measures of concentration and market power are produced by the 
same underlying conditions that determine other variables of interest (dispersion, average 
fare, etc).  His conclusion that “in the long-run equilibria with which cross-section studies 
must be primarily concerned, essentially all variables that have been employed in such 
studies are logically endogenous” seems to apply here.  As such, this empirical study has 
been conducted under the knowledge of endogeneity issues that cannot be corrected for.  The 
results, therefore, are descriptive rather than structural, providing a basis for describing 
relationships among variables while evaluating current theories and steering the direction of 
new theoretical developments.  A secondary empirical setup designed to limit the problems 
of endogeneity is presented, although the restrictions necessary to limit such problems reduce 
the number of interesting regressors. 
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This problem of HHI endogeneity is a common problem faced by all previous studies and 
dealt with in different ways – often not at all.  Hayes and Ross (1998), as well as Stavin 
(2000), used the number of carriers on a route as one construction of the HHI.  They also 
used information on flights offered per market obtained through the DOT’s T100 Domestic 
Segment Data, which contains information about airline capacity and flight frequency on 
markets.  This flight information was used as an instrument on HHI constructs of various 
types that are not used in the current paper84.  A moving average error structure was included 
to reduce the autocorrelation problem inherent in the time series data, and lagged values of 
several variables were employed in order to reduce simultaneity bias85.  Yet such an attempt 
to fix endogeneity warrants another reference to Schmalensee, who argues that the use of 
lagged values of relevant variables is similarly unlikely to provide consistent estimations, as 
such estimators are very likely to be serially correlated86.   
Borenstein and Rose (1994) used flight information obtained through the Official Airline 
Guide for the midpoint date in 1986-quarter 2 in order to provide a separate measure of 
market share87.  Singal (1996), as well as Kim and Singal (1993), constructed the HHI in the 
same manner as in the current paper.  They, along with Graham et al (1983) and Stavin 
(2000), accepted the limitations inclusion of such a variable would impose upon their results.  
Stavin went so far as to assume HHI to be exogenous.  In sum, all of these issues that arose in 
previous studies are present in the current study, and will likely be present in any Industrial 
Organization study of pricing in such industries as the airline industry.   
                                                 
84
 They used four different measures of Herfindahl deemed relevant, explaining the concern of simultaneity 
bias. 
85
 The moving average autocorrelation correction has not been employed. 
86
 See the Handbook of Industrial Organization, pp 953-956. 
87
 They used May 15, 1986 as the date for their flight information because their study was a cross-sectional 
study of the second quarter or 1986. 
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